

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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BULLETIN



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Regional Arrangements and the United Nations

Article by **WARD P. ALLEN**

I

Coexistent with the development of the concept of the modern nation state as the highest manifestation of sovereign policy organization, the idea of an even wider organization of which the states themselves would be component parts began to manifest itself. Based on racial and cultural similarities and a concomitant geographical proximity, these interstate arrangements were naturally regional in character. Where the attracting forces were great and the still growing concept of national sovereignty not too firmly imbedded, these regional arrangements became the forerunner of closer organization which resulted in union.

The Germanic Confederation of thirty-eight Central European States and free cities, established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, is an example. Although it was formally dissolved in 1866 by Prussia as a part of its struggle for supremacy with Austria, this regional system was the working political organization which held the states of central Europe together and constituted the basis upon which, after the exclusion of Austria, the modern Germanic state was created.

The inter-American system, on the other hand, whose beginning as a grouping of Spanish American states may be traced back to 1820, has evolved more slowly and, for sound historical reasons, not on the basis of an all-embracing constitution, but rather by the gradual accumulation of traditions, the creation of a complex of specific agencies and institutions, and the effect of the resolutions, treaties, and conventions of inter-American assemblies.

Brief mention of some of the modern tendencies toward the development of regional or subregional systems in other geographical areas may provide a setting for the subsequent consideration of the problems of the United Nations Charter.

The Covenant of the League of Nations gave wide latitude to the establishment of regional arrangements by providing in Article 21 that

"Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

Thus there was virtually complete freedom for the operation of almost any type of regional arrangement.

With respect to the European region as a whole, the idea of a general European federation, stimulated particularly during the inter-war period by the proposals of M. Briand to the League Assembly in 1929, resulted in the establishment by the League of a "Commission of Inquiry for European Union" composed of the European members. However, little concrete action emerged from its discussions. At the present time the idea appears again to be gaining some currency.

Within Europe one of the outstanding examples of regionalism following the first World War was the Little Entente. Composed of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and created shortly after the conclusion of the war, it grew out of a series of bilateral mutual assistance treaties among the three countries. It gradually developed into a broader political organization and, after 1933, came to approximate a close diplomatic confederation with definite organizational structure. The Entente played a significant role in helping to stabilize conditions in Central Europe.

The five Balkan countries and Turkey, despite the differences among them, have exhibited sig-

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nificant tendencies toward close economic collaboration and political understanding as bases for the formation of a regional system. The four Balkan conferences of representatives of these states (1930-32), although semi-official in character, did much to pave the way toward Balkan union along political, social, and economic lines and created or stimulated the establishment of a number of organizations and commissions. The Balkan Entente (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece, Turkey) created by the pact of 1934, although not realizing the broader aims toward which the conferences had been working, was an effort at regional security within the Balkan area, later supplemented by agreements to give organizational structure to the Entente.

With regard to eastern Europe in general, although in 1942 attempts through agreements between Poland and Czechoslovakia and between Greece and Yugoslavia to work toward groupings of small states did not meet with success, a broader regional grouping of the nations of eastern Europe under the leadership of the U. S. S. R. is gradually but effectively evolving through a series of bilateral arrangements and agreements. The possibility of a closer union of the Baltic states—Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia—led to a series of conferences of representatives of these states, beginning in 1920 in Helsinki, Riga, and other capitals, but the efforts proved unproductive. Again in 1938-39 Finland and Sweden proposed a limited defensive alliance with Norway and Denmark, but the arrangement was not completed. As recently as February 1946 an article in the Soviet publication *Pravda* stated that certain interests were agitating for the formation of a "Northern Bloc" which presumably would include Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland. Concern was expressed in the article that the proposed bloc might also include "a reconstructed Germany."

The idea of a closer union of the western European states is at the present time enjoying certain advocacy. As set forth by Leon Blum, in September 1945, such an arrangement would have an Anglo-French alliance as its basis and would include the "democratic" states of northern and western Europe as well as "future republics" of Italy and Spain.

In the Near East a recent and highly significant development in regional arrangements is the creation of the League of Arab States composed of

Syria, the Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Yemen. It was given formal existence upon the signing of the pact of the League of Arab States at Cairo, on March 22, 1945, as a result of a series of preliminary meetings stimulated by war conditions and special problems arising in that area. The constituent states have made full use of this League as a vehicle for common action in the Palestine situation.

In the Far East, the Japanese attempt to create a "Co-prosperity Sphere", although based on suppression and conquest and ruthless domination by one power, constituted, nevertheless, an attempt to form a regional system.

There have likewise been various moves toward what may be termed "sub-regional" groupings. The proposal for a union of the states of Central America and for the closer association of the Bolivarian countries (Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador) are examples within the inter-American field.

The British Commonwealth of Nations, in which the Dominions are free and sovereign although closely associated nations, is not a "regional system" within any definition involving geographical limitations, but is, nevertheless, a special groupment of states which share in common with the regional arrangements mentioned a somewhat similar status in terms of relationship with a world organization. There have been in the past few years a number of semi-official and non-official suggestions for a closer association of the United States with the United Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth which would convert this association into an Anglo-Saxon group. Mr. Winston Churchill's plea to this effect in his Fulton, Missouri, speech on March 5, 1946 brought this issue sharply to the fore.

In addition to all of these developments which in general envisage arrangements involving political, security, economic, social, and cultural collaboration in varying degrees and in most cases a definite organizational structure, there are likewise existing or proposed arrangements, often regional in character, for more limited military and security purposes. They may in some instances be the precursors of broader, regional systems; but they do not necessarily rest upon the same ethnic or cultural bases or the same considerations of geographical proximity as the latter. The present Russo-British treaty of May 26, 1942, the Franco-Russian treaty of December 10, 1944, and the Sino-Russian treaty of August 14, 1945

are, together with similar treaties between Russia and Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, perhaps the most outstanding examples of this more limited arrangement. That these bilateral agreements between the U.S.S.R. and various states of east-central Europe may be the skeleton for a more extensive network of alliances which would develop into a regional system is indicated by the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Polish Alliance on May 18, 1946 and a Czechoslovak-Yugoslav treaty of friendship on May 9, 1946. These agreements, reminiscent of the beginnings of the Little Entente, may be significant indications of the future pattern of development in this area.

II

The significance of all such regional and special associations of nations and of the forces manifested by the tendencies toward these regional groupings have been intensified and sharpened by the creation of the new world organization. The establishment of the United Nations has required a consideration of all regional arrangements in the light of the role which the Charter provides for them and their appraisal from the point of view of consistency with its terms.

The framers of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and of the Charter were confronted with a fundamental decision in determining the extent to which the world organization should be erected upon the basis of regional federations. There were many and prominent advocates, both in this country and abroad, of the view that such semi-autonomous groups of states would provide the soundest foundation for the organization. It was urged that a pyramiding of authority, leading from the nation to the regional organization, with the world organization concerning itself only with inter-regional affairs, was the only consistent and practicable method to give full representation and protection to the interests of the smaller nations, to avoid burdening the general organization with local controversies and situations more easily solved within the region, and to lessen economic rivalry and encourage constructive economic and financial policies among the states in each area.

The decision on this basic issue was made early. It was agreed that the organization must be a world unity of individual states and not an association of regional federations.

This basic pattern is reflected in the Dumbarton

Oaks Proposals, particularly in Chapter VIII, Section C. This section, although not seeking affirmatively to promote regional arrangements, stated that nothing in the proposed Charter should preclude their existence for dealing with appropriate matters relating to international security, "provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization."

With this as a frame of reference the problem was carried to the San Francisco conference where the relationship between regional and world systems became one of the most delicate of the conference issues.

It is, of course, impossible to seek to analyze any major Charter provision in isolation or on the exclusive basis of a particular set of interests, so complex are the factors motivating the positions of the various countries and so interrelated are the provisions of the Charter. At the San Francisco conference, however, the approach of the various countries to the problem of regional arrangements may be said to have been conditioned in part by one or another of five points of view, all of which operated in favor of varying degrees of autonomy for regional or other limited arrangements within the general framework of the United Nations:

1. The desire of the American republics to safeguard the inter-American system;
2. The similar feeling on the part of the states of the Arab League, for whom Egypt acted as spokesman, that the state of that League be preserved;
3. The wish of the U.S.S.R. to except from any restrictive control under the Charter the system of bilateral mutual assistance pacts;
4. France's concern over possible renewal of German aggression, leading her to seek freedom of action against ex-enemy states without the necessity of awaiting prior action by the Security Council;
5. The general uneasiness of the small states over the power granted the Security Council in the light of the Yalta voting formula.

These factors are, of course, reflections of certain of the regional developments referred to in Part I. Notably absent from the picture were the points of view of the Balkan and Baltic states not represented at the conference, whose previous

tendencies toward regionalism have been particularly noteworthy.

These five factors manifested themselves in a variety of ways in the amendments offered to this portion of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Eight of the American republics proposed that the inter-American system be specifically mentioned and approved in the Charter. Seven suggested that the right of Security Council intervention in the settlement of regional disputes be limited to cases where all regional measures had been attempted and had failed or where the regional group itself requested Council action.

The Egyptian delegation introduced a series of amendments to limit the term *regional arrangement* by definition to a grouping of several countries in a given geographical area which, by reason of community of interests or historical or other affinity, make themselves jointly responsible for the maintenance of peace and security within the region, for the safeguarding of their interests, and for the development of their economic and cultural relations.

The four sponsoring powers (China, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and United States) proposed as an amendment the language finally incorporated into Article 53 of the Charter to the effect that regional or other joint action should be permitted without prior authorization from the Security Council in the case of measures to prevent renewed aggression by the enemy states in the then present war, until responsibility therefor should be transferred to the United Nations by the governments concerned. This was similar to an amendment first separately presented by France which, proposed, in addition, a provision to the effect that authorization should not be required for measures of an urgent nature provided for in treaties of assistance of which the Security Council has been advised, subject, however, to an obligation to give an account to the Council of the measures taken.

A precursor of the provisions of Article 51 was offered by the Australian delegation which proposed that measures, regional or otherwise, taken in self-defense should become permissible in case of an emergency if the Security Council failed either to authorize such action or to take action itself.

Illustrative of the interrelation between the

problems of regional arrangements and the issue of the provisions on voting in the Security Council were amendments offered by Australia, Belgium, and Venezuela proposing that special voting rules be adopted for decisions of the Council regarding enforcement action by regional arrangements.

These and other proposals and suggestions, similar in character and based on similar considerations, are reflected in varying degrees in the final provisions of the Charter.

III

The final language of the Charter adds to the basic approach of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals two significant provisions which allow both enforcement or punitive action and preventive measures to be taken by regional agencies or other collective arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, under defined circumstances.

Articles 33 and 51 to 54, which set forth the relationship of such agencies and arrangements to the world organization in the security field, in conjunction with other pertinent provisions of the Charter, may be summarized as follows:

1. In general, nothing in the Charter "precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." (Art. 52, par. 1.)

2. With respect to the *peaceful settlement of disputes*,¹ the Charter imposes upon the *members* of regional arrangements or agencies the obligation to "make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes" through such institutions before referring them to the Security Council (Art. 52, par. 2). This is reinforced by a similar injunction upon "The *parties* to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security" to seek first of all a solution for peaceful means of their own choice, including "resort to regional agencies or arrangements" (Art. 33, par. 1). The obligation is laid upon the *Security Council* to "encourage the development of peaceful settlement of local disputes" through such regional arrangements or agencies (Art. 52, par. 3), and the Council "shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the

¹ Italics are the author's.

parties to settle" a specific dispute by peaceful means of their own choice, including regional arrangements (Art. 33, par. 2).

3. Beyond the realm of peaceful measures, the power of the regional system to take action in case of threats to or breaches of the peace or acts of aggression is at the same time both greater and less than its authority in the case of pacific settlement. The Security Council is directed to utilize regional arrangements or agencies for carrying out enforcement measures. But the authorization of the Council is required before measures which may be deemed "enforcement action" may be taken under regional arrangements or regional agencies (Art. 53, par. 1).

There are, however, two important exceptions to the above rule: one depending upon the state against which action is taken and the other upon the nature of the aggression against which action is sought. Authorization is not necessary if the measures, whatever their nature, are to be taken against any ex-enemy state of the second World War, either as provided for pursuant to Article 107² or in accordance with "regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state". (Art. 53, par. 1.) This exception ceases to exist only after the organization itself, "on request of the Governments concerned," is "charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state". (Art. 53, par. 1.)

The second exception becomes operative if the breach of the peace or act of aggression takes the form of "an armed attack". Article 51 provides that nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

4. These two exceptions, granting or recognizing the right to take action outside the machinery of the organization, do not refer exclusively to regional systems as does Article 52 concerning pacific settlement. The exception relating to

measures against ex-enemy states encompasses as well action pursuant to agreements among the Allied Powers arising out of the war, such as the Franco-Russian Mutual Alliance Treaty. The exception of the right of "individual or collective self-defense" similarly would include such a collective arrangement as is represented by the British Commonwealth of Nations.

5. However, the Charter makes it equally clear, that while the region may be expected to be the normal theater for the pacific settlement of at least "local" disputes, while regional agencies will be looked to in an important way in resolving such controversies by peaceful methods, and while Security Council authorization is not always necessary for enforcement action, nevertheless, the rights of the Security Council to take action at any time regarding any dispute remain unimpaired. These include the right of investigation (Art. 34) and of recommending "at any stage of a dispute" "appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" taking into account any procedures adopted by the parties (Art. 36).

In the second place, the existence or functioning of regional arrangements or agencies does not operate to prevent a member state from bringing any situation which might lead to international friction to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly (Art. 35). (Indeed Article 52 specifically states that it in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35).

Thirdly, the right of the General Assembly to discuss and make recommendations concerning any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 11) is not contingent upon action by regional agencies.

These various provisions establish the pattern for the integration of regional and other collective arrangements in the security field with the general system of international security. However, the scope of certain terms such as "regional arrangements of agencies" and "enforcement action" is not explicitly set forth. In the case of an armed attack, the integration of regional forces already in operation with those operating under the authority of the Security Council will have to be worked out. Only by the implementation of these provisions and their application to specific situations will their precise limitations and implications become clear.

(Continued on page 959)

² "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action."

The Russell Plan for the Organization of Positive Intelligence Research in the Department of State

I. Basic Philosophy

On April 22, 1946 the Secretary of State issued a series of regulations activating the Russell Plan¹ for the organization for research and intelligence in the Department of State.² In principle, the plan is simple. Organizationally, it is predicated in the fact that the Department of State is set up on a geographic basis.

The political policy finally formulated, however, with respect to a given country or area must include considerations of an economic, military, sociological, and even domestic character. Although policy, in the last analysis, must be accomplished on a geographic basis by the geographic offices as line or operating units, the analysis and evaluation of non-political or functional components of foreign policy are correlated through the offices under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary for economic affairs and the Assistant Secretary for public affairs.³ In performance of this function, these two offices operate as staff agencies.

Intelligence research to be most useful must be integrated into this general organization. It must be organized so as to serve the geographic offices in a "staff" capacity but at the same time serve the other "staff" echelons of the Department under the Assistant Secretaries for economic affairs and public affairs.

All research carried on must fit into a balanced departmental program of positive intelligence that is related to authoritatively determined intelligence requirements and objectives.

¹ Program planned by Donald S. Russell, Assistant Secretary for administration.

² BULLETIN of May 12, 1946, p. 826.

³ Exceptions to this principle of organization are found in the Office of Special Political Affairs and Office of the Assistant Secretary for occupied areas, where, because of the prospective military and multilateral relations involved, a special service organization is required.

⁴ BULLETIN of Feb. 3, 1946, p. 174.

II. Organizational Objectives

The forthcoming regulations are intended to accomplish certain basic objectives:

1. To establish the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence as the "staff arm" of the Secretary in the formulation and implementation of the Department's internal and interdepartmental programs of positive foreign intelligence.

2. To establish under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence an Advisory Committee on Intelligence which will through a strong subcommittee formulate a departmental program of intelligence research and assign project priorities.

3. To build up within each geographic office a Research Division which will provide strong research facilities at the point where political decisions are made or action is taken.

4. To build up as an office under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence a strong central coordination and liaison group which in order to implement the decisions of the subcommittee will—

(a) coordinate, monitor, and review all departmental research studies initiated anywhere in the Department;

(b) undertake such special research studies as may be required;

(c) be responsible for carrying out those duties assigned to it by the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence with relation to the National Intelligence Authority⁴ and any other Government agency concerned with the field of positive intelligence.

5. To establish as an office under the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence a central group for the collection and dissemination of positive intelligence data and materials.

III. Organizational Pattern

1. The Geographic Offices

Under the plan a Division of Research is attached to each geographic office. This is a self-

contained, non-operating "staff" unit at the office level, under its own chief who reports and is responsible to the director of the geographic office. The chief of the Research Division is responsible to the office director for the research program of the office and for the due accomplishment of the segment of the departmental research program assigned to the office by the Advisory Committee on Intelligence, through its Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities. The chief of the Division of Research should be the representative of the office director on the Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities. Though the chief of the Division of Research reports to the office director, he and his staff are expected to maintain the closest technical liaison on all matters of research with the Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison and other research units of the Department.

The purpose of establishing strong research units in the geographic offices is twofold: to provide balanced research facilities at the points where political policy is made or action taken; and to make the intelligence operation sensitive to, yet independent of, the policy-determining political divisions. In this manner, the office director is provided with an automatic system of checks and balances as between his "staff" or research division and his "line" or policy divisions.

2. *The Advisory Committee on Intelligence (ACI)*

The Russell Plan calls for the establishment of an Advisory Committee on Intelligence composed of the Assistant Secretaries for political affairs and the Assistant Secretary for administration, under the chairmanship of the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence. It is expected that this committee will meet only to consider matters of broad general policy in the field of positive intelligence. It will, however, have a working subcommittee with representation from the geographic and other appropriate offices of the Department. The job of the working subcommittee will be to formulate a balanced departmental program of research and to assign such priorities as will assure the optimum utilization of all departmental research resources so that departmental and interdepartmental intelligence requirements are assessed and fulfilled on the basis of essentiality and relative urgency.

The necessity for a working group of this character, which must be staffed by a strong secretariat, is illustrated by a partial listing of research con-

sumers whose competing requests for service will have to be evaluated and phased:

- Geographic Offices
- Economic Offices
- Information and Cultural Offices
- Special Political Affairs
- Occupied Areas
- National Intelligence Authority
- Military Intelligence Agencies
- (Military Intelligence Service
- (MIS), Office of Naval Intel-
- ligence (ONI), Joint Intelli-
- gence Committee (JIC), etc.)

To accomplish its mission effectively, the subcommittee of the ACI, that is the Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities, must be a responsible group, representative of the Department as a whole, each member of which must be authorized to speak for and bind his office. Each member of the subcommittee must be acceptable to the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence.

3. *The Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence*

The Special Assistant is the principal adviser to the Secretary with respect to all matters of positive intelligence. The ACI and its subcommittee are his consultative and advisory instruments for the formulation, planning, and phasing of the Department's research-intelligence program. Although the Special Assistant exercises direct "line" authority only over his own staff and the offices immediately under his jurisdiction (OCL and OCD), he has effective technical supervision over the Department's research program through the programming and priorities functions of ACI.

4. *Office of Intelligence Coordination and Liaison (OCL)*

The mission of OCL is vital to the success of the Russell Plan. It is expected, *inter alia*—

(a) to provide a permanent secretariat for the ACI and its subcommittee;

(b) to function, at the technical level, as the instrument for coordinating and correlating intelligence research in accordance with the programs formulated by the ACI and its subcommittee, for example by administering research priorities assigned in such programs and by applying in editorial review the research standard formulated by the ACI and its subcommittee;

(c) to operate as the center for distribution of research papers produced in the Research Divisions, so as to secure the maximum utilization compatible with security;

(d) to conduct specialized research on technical matters not within the cognizance of other research units; to organize and supervise cooperative research projects cutting across geographic and economic lines; to undertake such special studies as may be required of it by the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence;

(e) to participate, as directed by the Special Assistant for Research and Intelligence, in the Department's relations with the Central Intelligence Group of the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and other Government agencies in the field of positive intelligence.

As the liaison group of the Department with the Central Intelligence Group of the NIA and as the secretariat of ACI and its subcommittee, OCL is in a key position to coordinate the execution of the research program in its departmental and interdepartmental aspects. Because of this organizational vantage-point, it is in a position to provide ACI and its subcommittee with informed recommendations to guide its formulation of the research program or the assignment of priorities. It will be in a unique position to provide invaluable assistance to other research units of the Department with respect to the initiation, feasibility, or status of research projects.

5. *Office of Intelligence Collection and Dissemination (OCD)*

The functions of OCD are—

(a) to procure for the Department intelligence materials through various channels;

(b) to maintain files of intelligence materials for reference use by all offices of the Department;

(c) to collect factual information and opinions on important individuals in foreign countries whose activities or views are important in determining and implementing foreign policy and to maintain files of such material for use by all offices of the Department;

(d) to acquire and allocate to various governmental agencies foreign publications received through the Foreign Service establishment;

(e) to prepare visual materials such as charts, freehand illustrations, and mechanical drawings for all offices of the Department.

IV. *The Plan in Operation*

As soon as the ACI or its Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities establishes a basic research program for the Department and makes assignments thereunder, the intelligence operation will be on a current basis and every research project can be evaluable with respect to its importance and relative urgency.

1. *Clearance of Projects*

All projects to be undertaken by the Research Divisions, by OCL, or by other units of the Department except the Division of Research and Publication must be cleared through the program and priority mechanism. Several channels will be available, depending upon the origin of the project proposal. In the case of the geographic offices, the office director will send to the project unit of OCL any project proposal approved by him or, if he so authorizes, by his Research Division chief. If the project falls within the framework of the over-all departmental program this unit may immediately agree to the propriety and feasibility of the proposal and give clearance; in case of doubt the unit would consult with the director or his chief of research. If no agreement can be reached, the OCL project unit will present the case at the next session of the Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities (on which the initiating office would be represented) for decision.

Other offices of the Department such as A-B, A-C, or SPA⁵ will submit projects to the project unit of OCL directly or through the channel of the geographic offices when prior conversations with them make it appropriate. These offices will be represented on the Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities, will have access to the project unit of OCL directly, and will have access to the research facilities of the geographic Research Divisions, OCL, and OCD in accordance with the general program and priorities established by ACI or the Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities.

If requestors from outside the Department desire the Department to undertake research on their behalf they will send proposals to OCL through

⁵ Office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Benton; Office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Clayton; Office of Special Political Affairs.

established liaison channels. The project unit of OCL will then submit the proposal before clearance to the appropriate office of the Department for an opinion as to feasibility in relation to work load and to the office program.

2. Mobilization of Resources

A useful feature of the clearing process is that the ACI and OCL, being familiar with all resources of the research staffs, will be able to arrange joint action of various research units upon appropriate projects, thus in effect adding to the resources at the service of any one office. When necessary, they can negotiate with office directors for the formation of interoffice research teams for temporary action on specific projects. The Department in this way will make the most effective use of expert personnel no matter where the individuals may be located.

3. Project Lists

Further advantages flow from this centralized clearing procedure. It will be possible for the OCL to issue a list of projects actually under way and thus at once inform all parts of the Department about forthcoming work, always recognizing that producing units may for security reasons wish to limit such advertising of certain projects. Thereby the attention of various offices will be called to studies which may be of use to them, and duplication will be largely eliminated. While scanning a project, the staff can also prepare a proposed distribution list for the anticipated report which, if agreed to by the producing office, will facilitate rapid dissemination of the report when it is finished. The balance of maximum utilization with security considerations will be further guaranteed by locating in OCL the center for physical distribution of research studies.

4. Standards

Another concern of ACI, for the benefit both of the Department and of its "customers", is to maintain the quality and standardize the form of intelligence-research reports. For this purpose, ACI or its Subcommittee on Programs and Priorities will establish standards and expect OCL to examine all finished drafts before they are reproduced, to insure adherence to those standards. Only such editorial review can assure the continuous application of sound scholarship and critical method throughout the intelligence organization.

Actual procedures would parallel closely those of preliminary project clearance, with the same mechanism for reference to office directors or to the ACI in cases of disagreement.

In this fashion the ACI and OCL staff, in collaboration with the office directors and their Divisions of Research, will formulate a coordinated program of intelligence research. It will accomplish that program through the mechanism of priorities; it will facilitate production by organizing task groups where necessary; it will maintain quality in the product by fixing standards and exercising editorial review; it will assist in making the product effective by furnishing regular project reports and by proposing and effecting dissemination of studies.

V. Activating the Plan

It is essential that the plan be put into effect promptly. Subject to availability of funds for the fiscal year of 1947 this appears readily feasible with the exception of the transfer of the geographic divisions of the old Office of Research and Intelligence (ORI) to the appropriate geographic offices of the Department. The controlling factors here are availability of space and the necessity of preserving these research groups as functioning units until the geographic offices are in a position to accomplish organizational integration as called for by the plan.

To provide flexibility during the transitional period, the phasing of the transfer is to be determined by the Assistant Secretary for administration in the best interests of the Department of State as a whole.

PROCEDURE ON TYPICAL PROJECTS

1. *Project Initiated in a Geographic or Research Division* (e. g. *The Gouin Cabinet*—sample of a fairly routine project)

a. Project initiation

- (1) Project outlined by appropriate operating division chief.
- (2) Project discussed with chief of Research Division and cleared by office director, with tentative distribution list.
- (3) Project cleared by OCL coordination staff, which recommends and arranges with the office for its collaboration with Biographical Intelligence Division of OCD.
- (4) Distribution list discussed if necessary between OCL and office.

(Continued on page 945)

Rubber and World Economy

Article by WILLIAM T. PHILLIPS¹

THE IMPORTANCE of rubber to the world economy is evidenced by the dependence of motor transport and aviation upon this commodity. Rubber consumption has increased remarkably the world over. From 1917 when world rubber consumption first passed 200,000 tons to 1939 when world consumption reached 1,108,000 tons, the increase has been almost continuous except during the periods of depressed business conditions. From 1914 to 1925 the United States consumed approximately two thirds of the world rubber. This proportion, however, declined to about 50 percent during the immediate pre-war years as foreign consumption rapidly increased. The declining proportion of rubber consumed by the United States is attributable, in part, to the establishment by United States rubber manufacturers of foreign manufacturing plants with a consequent reduction in exports of finished rubber products.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, it became apparent that the conflagration might spread and the natural rubber-producing areas of the Far East might be lost. Consequently, industry and government spokesmen early in 1940 began active advocacy of a government-financed synthetic rubber program as a military security measure. The complexity of the synthetic rubber program and the conflicting interests of various patentees led to protracted preliminary negotiations. The first definite agreement regarding the establishment of a government synthetic rubber program was reached on May 15, 1941 when the Reconstruction Finance Corporation entered into a contract with four rubber companies for the construction and operation of copolymer plants (synthetic rubber plants). Each plant was designed for an initial annual capacity of 2,500 long tons, which, however, was expandable to 10,000 tons each. On July 3, 1941 the Rubber Reserve Com-

pany authorized the expansion of these four plants to 10,000 tons each. Facilities for the production of the butadiene and styrene (materials for making synthetic rubber) necessary for the operation of these expanded plants were also authorized.

During 1941 the natural rubber stockpiling program and the rubber-cotton barter agreement brought rapid increases in United States natural rubber stocks (from 125,000 tons at the end of 1939 to 533,344 tons at the end of 1941). The progress of the Japanese in the Pacific quickly indicated the urgency of providing for far greater synthetic rubber capacity; and the capacity authorized in July of 1941 by the Rubber Reserve Company was expanded, immediately after Pearl Harbor, to a total of 120,000 tons. On January 12, 1942 plans were approved for the construction of additional plants to bring total United States capacity up to 400,000 tons of general purpose synthetic rubber, known as GR-S, and shortly thereafter increased to a 600,000 tons annual capacity.

Following the fall of Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, a program was formulated which provided for 877,000 long tons of synthetic rubber a year including 705,000 tons of GR-S, 132,000 tons of butyl, and 40,000 tons of neoprene.

The recommendations of the Rubber Survey Committee, appointed in August 1942 and headed by Bernard Baruch, resulted in the freezing of synthetic rubber production into the established processes. Production of all types of synthetic rubber during the year ending December 31, 1945, approximated 820,000 long tons.

The establishment of this tremendous synthetic rubber industry within the United States, coupled with the potentialities for rubber production in the Far Eastern natural rubber-producing areas, provided a situation of considerable concern to the Department of State due primarily to the serious surplus rubber situation which threatened to develop during the post-war years. In order

¹ Mr. Phillips is special assistant to the Chief, International Resources Division, Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.

more adequately to appraise the rubber situation and to assist the Department in the formulation of rubber policy, an announcement was made in June 1944 that a Rubber Advisory Panel had been formed.² This panel, composed of leaders of the rubber manufacturing industry and government officials most intimately concerned with rubber affairs, was designed to provide a forum from which the Department could obtain factual information and the individual opinions of panel members on rubber matters of an international character.

Concurrent with the establishment of the Rubber Advisory Panel of the State Department the Governments of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom expressed to the United States Government concern regarding the potential post-war rubber situation, since they had produced 95 percent of the world's supply of natural rubber during pre-war years. In order to explore the possible post-war rubber situation, arrangements were made by the three Governments to hold exploratory rubber talks in London during early August 1944. At this meeting the representatives of the participating Governments—United Kingdom, Netherlands, and United States—attempted to forecast the probable post-war rubber supply-demand situation. It became immediately apparent during the course of this meeting that none of the three Governments had available adequate information. The participants therefore agreed to recommend to their Governments that more detailed analyses be made and that periodic meetings be held in order that the three Governments might have the advantage of the information and advice of one another regarding problems of mutual concern.

Consequently on September 21, 1944, by means of simultaneous press releases, the three Governments announced that they were prepared to participate in a Rubber Study Group. This group operating on a completely informal basis had the following terms of reference:

1. To meet from time to time to discuss common problems arising from the production, manufacture, or use of rubber (crude, synthetic, and reclaimed);
2. To initiate studies which bear on these common problems;
3. To examine these and other relevant studies, and to consider and suggest possible solutions.

The group, as such, was not authorized to make any recommendations; instead the members were to report severally to their Governments. Each Government would then have the advantage of all available information in arriving at unilateral policy decisions. Arrangements were also made to keep other interested governments informed of the studies made and of the results of the discussions of the group. The Rubber Study Group was to meet periodically and to function during such period as, in the opinion of each of the participating governments, it continued to serve the purposes for which it was designed.

In order to provide a means whereby the United States could obtain the best available statistical evidence in this country, there was established a technical subcommittee of the Rubber Advisory Panel composed of research people both from industry and from Government agencies. The technical subcommittee undertook an extensive survey of post-war rubber affairs and prepared for the Rubber Advisory Panel a document embodying its estimates of the potential post-war rubber situation.

In January 1945 the first meeting of the newly constituted Rubber Study Group was held in Washington. Each of the several governments presented to the group the fruits of its individual studies (the document prepared by the technical subcommittee was presented as the U. S. Delegation's contribution). The Rubber Study Group analyzed and reviewed the various documents which had been presented and prepared a joint document which embodied the consensus of the three delegations. In accordance with the terms of reference this statistical document was made available to 34 other interested governments. The Rubber Study Group delegates agreed on the desirability of periodic reconsideration of the post-war rubber potentialities, so that each of the member governments might undertake its own unilateral policy determinations based upon the best information available.

The principal points which emerged from this meeting were the following:

- (a) Discussion of these extensive studies revealed that there was great uncertainty about the future supply and demand, particularly the supply because of the occupation of the Far Eastern

² BULLETIN of June 10, 1944, p. 544.

producing territories and the doubts about conditions likely to prevail after their liberation.

(b) Despite the uncertainties, however, the group concluded that, within three to four years after liberation, production in the natural rubber areas of the world could, if required, reach an annual figure in the neighborhood of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons; synthetic rubber production capacity being 1 to $1\frac{1}{3}$ million tons annually.

(c) Taking into account consumption trends and probable future consumption of around $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons annually, the group concluded that a marked disequilibrium between productive capacity and consumption demand could develop in the course of a few years after liberation.

Following V-J Day and the liberation of the Far Eastern rubber producing areas including areas of Indochina, the Rubber Study Group held a meeting in order that the factors relating to natural rubber supplies might be reappraised and the world peacetime rubber consumption pattern examined. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States, and Netherlands invited the French Government to participate in this second meeting. This invitation was accepted by the French Government. This meeting of the Rubber Study Group, held in London during November 1945, was thus attended by representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Netherlands, and France. The United States was particularly anxious that a meeting be held at this time, since the Interagency Policy Committee on Rubber has been formed to make recommendations on United States policy with respect to rubber affairs. It was felt desirable to have the advantage of the latest possible information from all sources when considering the United States position on such matters as the disposition of synthetic rubber plants, natural rubber stockpiling, and the amount of synthetic to continue in production and use for purposes of national security.

The Group concluded that:

1. Stocks of natural rubber in the Far East upon liberation would amount to some 290,000 long tons;
2. Arrivals of natural rubber in consuming areas would approximate 625,000 long tons for 1946; 920,000 long tons for 1947; and 1,320,000 long tons in 1948;
3. Annual rubber consumption (synthetic and natural) was likely to be of the order of 1,500,000 long tons for the next few years;

4. Natural rubber arrivals coupled with potential synthetic production could result in a serious surplus sometime after 1947.

Following the return of the U. S. representatives from the November meeting of the Rubber Study Group, the Interagency Policy Committee on Rubber, under the chairmanship of William L. Batt, undertook an exhaustive study of all aspects of the rubber situation preparatory to the making of recommendations on the rubber policy of the United States. This committee, established by John W. Snyder, Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, was instructed to survey plans and programs and make recommendations on:

1. The maintenance of a synthetic rubber industry;
2. The maintenance of stand-by rubber plants;
3. The disposal of surplus rubber plants;
4. The encouragement of rubber research and development;
5. The establishment of a strategic stockpile of rubber;
6. The development of wild and cultivated natural rubber in South America;
7. The establishment and maintenance of a mutually advantageous program for importing natural rubber from the Far East.

After some months of investigation, research, consultation, and hearings, the Interagency Policy Committee on Rubber presented its first report to Mr. Snyder. The complexity of rubber affairs and the requirement of more study on some aspects of the problem made it desirable to defer recommendations on those aspects in which the future seemed unclear. However, the first report, made public March 18, 1946, included much of interest to the public, to Congress, and to foreign governments—particularly to natural rubber producers.

The Committee's findings were divided into the following short-run and long-run recommendations.

Short-run Recommendations:

1. The synthetic rubber industry should, and will of necessity, continue to operate at a high level in order to supply the large demand for new rubber.
2. In order to distribute natural rubber supplies equitably throughout the world, international pooling and allocation of natural rubber should be continued.

3. Until ample supplies of natural rubber are assured, all but the least efficient synthetic rubber plants should be maintained in operation or stand-by condition.

4. Stocks of natural rubber in the United States should be increased in this early period in which new supplies are likely to be uncertain, so that adequate stocks will be available to support a somewhat higher rate of natural rubber consumption and to safeguard the national interest.

5. Government powers to allocate rubber to manufacturers and to control specifications of rubber products should be continued as long as the demand for natural rubber exceeds the supply. These powers expire on June 30, 1946, the present termination date of the Second War Powers Act. The powers of that act relating to rubber should therefore be extended.

6. Consistent with natural rubber receipts and the necessity for building up an inventory of natural rubber, the proportions of natural rubber permitted to be used in civilian products should be gradually increased.

7. Manufacturers should be allotted small amounts of natural rubber for experimental purposes, since throughout the war little experimentation was possible to determine the most desirable proportions of natural and synthetic rubber to use in a given rubber article.

8. Until such time as private enterprise assumes the responsibility, the Government must of necessity continue to own and operate sufficient synthetic rubber facilities to meet the needs of the domestic economy.

9. The Government should continue to sponsor broad rubber-research programs. It should also encourage private industry to undertake research with private funds.

10. Some form of national rubber supervision should be established in which all Government agencies having responsibility in the rubber field would be represented. This body should coordinate all governmental activities pertaining to rubber. It should also keep the rubber situation under continuous review in order to recommend to the President and the Congress desirable changes in the national rubber policy.

Long-run Recommendations:

1. There should be continuously maintained in production and use, regardless of cost, sufficient

synthetic rubber capacity to meet at least one third of our general purpose rubber requirements. This involves a minimum consumption of general-purpose synthetic rubber in the neighborhood of 250,000 long tons per year. The plants maintained in production should comprise the most efficient and low-cost facilities existing at present. Consequently, the inclusion of plants using alcohol as a raw material is not now indicated.

2. The Committee's recommendation as to the best method of assuring a minimum use of synthetic rubber will be submitted in a supplemental report. The necessary legislation should be based on a policy of minimum government interference and of maximum scope for private enterprise.

3. Private ownership and operation of the synthetic rubber industry should be a major objective, if practicable. The Committee feels that this will provide an important incentive to research and development. In the interest of developing competitive conditions in the synthetic rubber industry, it is desirable that the amount of production capacity in private hands should exceed the amount of guaranteed use.

4. Such efficient general-purpose synthetic rubber plants as are in excess of those required for the minimum program should, if not acquired by private industry and available for the production of synthetic rubber, be maintained by the government in adequate stand-by condition. After natural rubber is in ample supply and as long as these plants are owned by the government, they should not be operated except in a national rubber emergency. In order to avoid complete reliance upon petroleum as a raw material, at least one plant using alcohol feedstocks should be included in the capacity maintained in adequate stand-by condition. The total of general-purpose synthetic rubber plants in operation or stand-by would approach about 600,000 long tons yearly capacity in the light of present estimates. This total is about 60 percent of our present existing capacity.

5. Broad research programs for quality and cost improvements in the synthetic rubber field should be continued by government and private industry. The Department of Agriculture should continue experiments with the cultivation and processing of botanic sources of natural rubber capable of being cultivated in the United States and tropical America.

(Continued on page 961)

German Documents on Hitler's Plans For the Future of Norway and Denmark, 1942

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM

BERLIN, *February 17, 1942.*

I. Minister President Quisling, who was seated near me at dinner today at one of the ceremonies in his honor, described to me his visit to the Führer. He had left with the Führer a memorandum which might also be of interest to the Foreign Office. So that I might read it at leisure he handed me a copy which he had with him, which is enclosed herewith. Naturally I took no stand with respect to Quisling's ideas, but was entirely receptive.

II. From Ministerialdirektor Kritzinger of the Reich Chancellery I have heard that Reich Minister Lammers will take up with the Foreign Office for further attention the points raised in the memorandum. In Reich Minister Lammers' view the memorandum goes far beyond the bounds of possibility. Possibly, however, a compromise solution could be reached on the following bases:

1. Establishment of peace without conclusion of a peace treaty.
2. Establishment of a consular office in Berlin and of mutual consular representation in several other countries.

Referred, via the Secretary of State, to the Reich Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

[Enclosure]

These are translations of documents on Hitler's plans for the future of Norway and Denmark, secured from German Government files, and are among the German official papers which the BULLETIN is currently publishing; German documents on the invasion of Norway appeared in the BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1946. For an article on and excerpts from a German handbook of propaganda directives and for German documents on Sumner Welles' mission in 1940, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1946, p. 278; Mar. 3, 1946, p. 311; Mar. 10, 1946, p. 365; and Mar. 24, 1946, p. 459.

These documents have been selected and translated by J. S. Beddie, an officer in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW ORDER IN NORWAY

The decision on the New Order in Europe, and therefore in Norway as well, lies, of course, with the German Führer and Reich Chancellor. But as the one responsible for the national interests of Norway I consider it my duty, for the common interests of Germany and Norway to set forth the following:

1. *Immediate preliminary peace*

If the then existing Norwegian Government on April 9, 1940 had acceded to the wishes of the Reich Chancellor, peace would have been maintained between the two countries. Account would have been taken fully of all German requirements made necessary by the war. The Quisling Government wishes to produce such a condition now and thereafter to proceed with the laying of foundations for a Great Germanic League.

The situation of the German forces in Norway would certainly be improved by the restoration of peace.

Those who now struggle in vain for the freedom and independence of Norway at the side of England and to this end carry on espionage and acts of sabotage, through the reestablishment of independence and peace would find all grounds for their activities removed. No one can rightfully keep on fighting for a thing which has been already attained. This would be of added importance in case of possible attack on Norway. The attackers could then count on no support on the part of the population, but on the contrary on a negative attitude.

In this connection it may be of interest to cite what President Roosevelt said in his last New Year's address before the American Congress:

"Our overwhelming superiority of armaments must be adequate to put weapons of war at the proper time into the hands of those men in the conquered nations, who stand ready to seize the first opportunity to revolt against their German and Japanese oppressors, and against the traitors in their own ranks, known by the already infamous

name of Quislings. (*Applause.*) And I believe it to be no rash prophecy, when I state that as we get guns to the patriots in those lands, they, too, will fire shots heard round the world." (*Applause.*)

Since there now exists in Norway a Government recognized by Germany, made up of men who never wanted war with Germany, but did everything to prevent it, which strives for close friendship with Germany and now is collaborating with Germany in the closest manner, it would seem understandable to all if Germany did not desire immediate peace with a Norway led by such a Government.

Through the reestablishment of independence the Norwegian people will gain confidence in Germany and the conclusion of peace will quiet the general situation.

As indicated this course would only strengthen the military position of the German armed forces in Norway. The war requirements of the German forces would continue to be cared for without change and the necessary freedom of operations would for the duration of the war, be not only assured, but supported by all the strength of the National Government.

By the declaration of Norwegian independence and the restoration of peace Germany would take the offensive politically and seize the initiative. From the propaganda point of view this would represent a great success for Germany. England and America would be deprived of their great propaganda weapon, the charge that "Germany wishes to deprive nations of their independence and to oppress them." The effect which this would have on the greater part of public opinion, in Europe, North and South America, even in the whole world, could not be overestimated. Of this one can get an idea, if he follows the world-wide blasts of propaganda hostile to Germany on the subject of the establishment of the Quisling Government in Norway. They fear nothing more than that this Government should receive its unqualified independence.

It is essential to mobilize all Norwegian national forces for cooperation with Germany and for the New Order in Europe, which can only be achieved through the conclusion of peace and reestablishment of independence. A contrary course produces uncertainty and doubt in the population and forces many good national elements along false paths.

To lead all desirable elements along the right road is especially important in the case of Norway, which forms a foundation stone of the New Order in Europe and to a certain extent has become regarded in world-wide propaganda as an example. Just so will the fate of Norway serve as an example for the other Nordic and Germanic states of what they in future may have to expect or fear from Germany.

The Quisling Government through the conclusion of peace would be in a position to reestablish legations, which also would have a favorable result for Germany, since thereby, among other effects, the dangerous influence which the present legations of the Nygaardsvold emigré government exercise, would be largely eliminated. For example a Norwegian national legation in Stockholm would produce for Germany an immediate result of importance for the war. In Sweden there are (a) about 300,000 tons of seaworthy Norwegian shipping, (b) at least 100,000 tons of Norwegian shipping not seaworthy at present.

Under present conditions the Norwegian emigré government in London exercises control over these ships.

A Norwegian legation recognized by Sweden and established at Stockholm would not only minimize at once the influence in Stockholm of the Norwegian emigré government, but would secure the immediate availability of Norwegian shipping lying in Sweden, needed urgently for war transport requirements.

The solution indicated by the present arrangement, namely that our foreign representation be assimilated to the German legations, and in Berlin to the office of the Reichskommissar, would bring the Quisling Government into a very difficult position with the Norwegian people.

By the establishment of independent Norwegian legations our common interests would secure a double representation abroad (through Germany and through Norway), which must certainly be considered a strengthening of German influence.

The independent legations are actually both desirable and necessary. Foreign policy carried out in common would be aided by mutually confidential and secret information furnished both Foreign Offices.

As soon as the Germanic League under German leadership is established, a Germanic League Council would meet periodically in Berlin under

German chairmanship. To this the Germanic countries would send their Minister Presidents or Foreign Ministers as plenipotentiaries.

The League Council would set up the basic principles of the common Germanic foreign policy.

A Norwegian Foreign Minister is necessary since Sweden and Denmark both have one. These countries would not be prepared voluntarily to give up their own Foreign Offices, since these are symbols of independence. Germany would attain the same end by coordination of foreign policies through the Germanic League Council. If Germany considers it important to establish the Great German League, the proper line of development must not be hindered by unsuitable measures, which would arouse the greatest opposition in all of Scandinavia.

The conditions of a preliminary peace agreement should be determined at once and commissions on the part of Germany and of Norway for the arrangement of a definitive treaty should be formed. (A draft, in which appear proposals for the principal points of the preliminary peace agreement, is added as an enclosure.)

2. *Final conclusion of peace*

I assume that the peace negotiations on all points in question will not need to consume too long a time and if the definitive conclusion of peace between Germany and Norway could be proclaimed on April 9, the anniversary of the occupation, it would be very desirable.

3. *Reciprocal representation*

The influence of Germany in Norway is assured through the establishment of the present Norwegian Government and the movement standing behind it. A close and friendly cooperation between the German and Norwegian ministries can be provided through the exchange of officials.

To underline the idea of alliance it would be very desirable if the reciprocal representations could be designated as Embassies.

4. *Cooperation with the German armed forces*

The idea mentioned in an official pronouncement from Berlin of a lease of bases (parallel to the 99-year lease of English bases by America) contradicts the Germanic idea conceived of by Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler and myself. Between Germanic states there are no leased bases, but only common defense of the common Germanic area against the common enemy. Norway voluntarily puts at the disposal of the German Reich as the

leader of the Germanic League of States the necessary harbors and air fields for the common defense and the carrying on of offensive warfare, for the Navy and Air Force will be in future in the Germanic League of States a common league Navy and Air Force. The coast defense and the Norwegian National Army remain under Norwegian command.

This arrangement, which is considered as a goal for after the war, should be announced at present. It would be desirable, by application of the existing basic laws on general obligatory military service, to begin at once the organization of a Norwegian army corps of three divisions, as well as to bring the volunteer Norwegian Legion up to the strength of an enlarged regiment.

Attention should also be given at once to a better liaison between the German armed forces and the Norwegian Government in order to assure the necessary confidential collaboration. I therefore request the naming of armed-service attachés. It is also necessary that all Wehrmacht units in Norway be directed to support the NS [Nasjonal Samling] in every way with all their power.

5. *With the conclusion of peace* Norway will at once adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and also to the Three Power Pact, as soon as the National Government feels strong enough to undertake the obligations accompanying it.

6. *Concerning economic and supply questions* a separate memorandum will be forwarded.

Oslo, February 10, 1942.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT

PRINCIPAL POINTS OF PRELIMINARY PEACE AGREEMENT

Point 1. Germany recognizes Norway as a free and independent state, with equal rights.

Point 2. Germany waives war damages.

Point 3. The German Wehrmacht is assured for the duration of the war necessary freedom of operation in Norway.

Point 4. The Norwegian economy for the duration of the war will operate to its full capacity in the interests of the European war against England.

Point 5. In the peace negotiations with England Germany will support with all its force the justified demands of Norway upon England for indemnity on account of

(a) the involvement of Norway in the war as a result of England's war policy,

- (b) the theft of Norwegian gold and of the Norwegian merchant and whaling fleet,
- (c) other related war damage.

Point 6. There will be established as soon as possible between Germany and Norway an alliance which will serve as a basis for a Great Germanic League. Principal points of the alliance:

(a) Active reciprocal participation in the defense of both states under the supreme command of the supreme German commander.

(b) A common Germanic Navy and Air Force, but an independent Norwegian Army and a coastal defense, apart from the necessary larger bases and air fields under the control of the common Navy and Air Force.

The expenses of the common Navy and Air Force will be allotted in proportion to the population of the two states.

(c) The necessary common foreign policy will be conducted through reciprocal confidential and intimate exchange of information on the part of both Foreign Offices.

Point 7. There will meet at once a commission named on the part of both Germany and Norway for the arrangement of the definitive terms of peace and the final peace treaty.

REICH MINISTER LAMMERS TO MINISTER PRESIDENT
QUISLING

Berlin, 17 September 1942.

Secret Air Mail

HONORABLE MINISTER PRESIDENT!

By my letter of June 22, 1942 I informed you that the Führer did not consider that the existing stage of the war was a suitable time in which to adjust finally the relationship between the Great German Reich and Norway. The Führer has delegated me to inform you further that the definitive adjustment of these relations can only be achieved after the end of the war. The Führer accordingly desires that during the war no negotiations or discussions occur on the subject of a final or temporary peace settlement between the Great German Reich and Norway, or on the subject of other steps which might affect in any way the relationship of Norway to the Reich after the war. For the duration of the war the existing situation of Norway politically, as well as the situation in law and international law, shall be maintained, so that the matter of diplomatic representation, or

even of commercial representation, shall not arise. Accordingly Norwegian interests abroad should be taken care of by the competent authorities of the German Reich, *vis-à-vis* the Reich Government through the Reich Commissar, in the occupied territories through the German administration of these territories, in friendly countries through the existing diplomatic missions of the Reich therein or through the Foreign Office.

The Führer requests that all political questions affecting Norway, which require discussion with the Reich, be taken up exclusively with the Reich Commissar as the sole responsible representative of the Führer for the field of Norwegian civil affairs, and also that any requests which you may wish to bring before the Führer personally, be channeled regularly by way of the Reich Commissar. In the protection of Norwegian interests in the occupied territories and abroad, the Reich Commissar through the competent German authorities, would be glad to know of those Norwegians who belong to or are favorable to the NS, who might be used as advisers. If matters are not so handled, I would be compelled where required to act in the sense of this directive.

The Führer would be especially grateful to you, Honorable Minister President, if you on your side would take steps to suppress any discussion which may arise within your organization aimed at an alteration of the position of Norway politically or in international law, since such discussions under the prevailing conditions of German-Norwegian relations could only be detrimental.

The Führer hopes that it will be possible within a reasonable time to see you again for a conference in person and he asks that his faithful regards be conveyed to you.

With the expression of my highest regard I remain,

Yours very respectfully,

Dr. LAMMERS

FOREIGN OFFICE MEMORANDUM
State Secret

Counsellor of Legation Hensel of the Legation at Copenhagen, who arrived here by airplane this afternoon, at the request of the Acting Plenipotentiary Chargé d'Affaires Barandon, informed me verbally as follows:

The new Commanding Officer of the German troops in Denmark, General von Hannecken on October 2, 1942, the day of his arrival in Copen-

hagen, visited the Acting Plenipotentiary Chargé d'Affaires Barandon at the Legation and in the presence of SS Brigade Commander Kanstein and Lt. Col. Count Brandenstein-Zeppelin, Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, informed him of the instructions which he had received from the Führer verbally on October 1. The essential content of these instructions is as follows:

The Führer proceeded on the principle that the declarations of April 9, 1940, on which the relationship of Germany and Denmark hitherto rested, had, through the developments of the past years and the conduct of the Danes themselves, become obsolete. He had for some time regarded these commitments as troublesome and unsuitable. These declarations had had their justification in a time when a long duration of the war was not expected and when the developments which had occurred in the meantime had not been foreseen. Now they must be eliminated. For the future it was impossible that in the New Europe established under German leadership there should exist a form of state with a democratic government and under a royal house which up to now had displayed nothing but ill-will. For the future it was entirely impossible that he, the Führer, should restore Denmark in its previously existing form (meaning that German troops should leave Denmark). On the contrary, he needed Denmark, as he needed Norway, to hold England in check and for this the possession of Denmark was essential. Denmark must become a German province.

For the fact that things had gone as far as they had, the Danes themselves, with their King and Government, were to blame. The King and the royal house had never concealed their unfavorable attitude and their preference for Sweden and England. A Danish Minister had been allowed to leave the country and the volunteers of the Freikorps Dänemark had been ridiculed and mistreated. The Danish Government and the King had let the opportunity escape and had never made us an offer of North Schleswig. The royal house and the present form of government were disturbing factors in developments as a whole and therefore he had finally come to the conclusion that both should be put aside.

For the way things had gone, so the Führer expressly declared, no blame could be cast on either

the Plenipotentiary von Renthe-Fink or on General Lüdke. They had within the limits of their respective spheres acted correctly according to their instructions then in force. From now on, however, there would be new basic principles.

As Plenipotentiary would come a hard-fisted National Socialist and the Military Commanding Officer as well as the armed forces would regard themselves as not in a friendly, but in a hostile country. He forbade the Commanding General to make a call on the King. He could let the Foreign Minister know through a message from his adjutant that he had taken over command (which procedure had already been followed). In case the King wished to confer with him or see him personally, the Commanding General should not be available. The members of the armed forces must break off all relationship with Danes.

As regards the government the aim must be to establish as soon as possible a regime under the leadership of the Danish National Socialists. Whether the party leader of the Danish National Socialists, Dr. Frits Clausen, was the right person or whether he had a large or small proportion of the Danish people behind him was completely unimportant. The Führer needs in Denmark a puppet government which will do everything he requires of it. Even the English have set up puppet governments in Iran and Iraq. The head of this government must always be conscious that in case of a possible withdrawal of German troops he would be hanged to the nearest lamp post. The Führer in this connection would see that the new Plenipotentiary to be appointed would receive the necessary instructions.

Any resistance, even the slightest, must be suppressed by force. Should it appear that the Danish police force does not suffice or does not act in accordance with our desires, additional military forces, possibly also SS troops will be made available.

In connection with the expression of the King's regrets,¹ the Führer declared that he wished that the Danish Government be only informed that he had taken note of the King's regrets. A visit by the Crown Prince need not be discussed.

On the subject of the royal family the Führer added that he did not consider an abdication of the King appropriate at present.

BERLIN, October 3, 1942. VON GRUNDHERR

¹ Refers to the incident of the King's reply to Hitler's birthday greeting.

The United Nations

The Security Council

SOVIET-IRANIAN MATTER

Letters From the Iranian Ambassador to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General¹

20 May 1946

SIR:

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of such information as is available on this date, 20 May, to the Government of Iran with respect to the matters brought by Iran to the attention of the Security Council.

I remain, Sir,

Your obedient servant

HUSSEIN ALA
Iranian Ambassador

His Excellency, MR. TRYGVE LIE,
Secretary-General of the United Nations

20 May, 1946

SIR,

In compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 April and 8 May 1946 and with reference to the report submitted on 6 May 1946 on behalf of the Government of Iran, I beg to state that there is not sufficient first hand information available to my Government as to the true state of affairs throughout Azerbaijan to make the complete report requested by the Security Council.

Such information as is available to me up to 5 o'clock this afternoon is to the effect that as a consequence of the interferences previously complained of, the Iranian Government is still being prevented from exercising any effective authority in the Province of Azerbaijan and that Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran has not ceased. It has, therefore, not been possible to make such investigation as is required to establish that all of the Soviet troops have been withdrawn from the whole of Iran and, in particular, to investigate reports that Soviet soldiers have been left in Azerbaijan in civilian clothes and that military equip-

ment had been placed at the disposal of those who challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

While a commission has been appointed and is now stated to be in the city of Tabriz to make inquiries about conditions throughout the Province of Azerbaijan, it is doubtful that an adequate investigation can be conducted or a satisfactory report made by the Government of Iran until this Government is in a position to exercise its full authority throughout the Province of Azerbaijan.

The deep concern of Iranians regarding the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Iran and the maintenance of international peace and security is a matter of common knowledge. The disputes which my Government had believed would end by reason of the assurances of the Soviet Union given to the Security Council cannot be said, in reality, to have been resolved in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the report of 6 May, 1946, I stated:

"While it is hoped that arrangements can be made which will remove the unfortunate results of the interferences complained of, it is impossible to forecast at this time with certainty what the subsequent developments will be."

Unfortunately, the course of events since this statement was made has demonstrated that the threat to the integrity of Iran and to international peace has grown more serious.

I have not received from my Government authentic information with respect to the reported clashes between Iranian Troops and the military forces in Azerbaijan organized during the period of Soviet occupation. If the reports of armed conflict in this strategically critical area are true, ob-

¹ Security Council Documents S/66 and S/68 21 May 1946.

viously the danger to international peace and security is both serious and imminent.

I have the honour [etc.]

HUSSEIN ALA
Iranian Ambassador

His Excellency, M. ALEXANDRE PARODI,
President of the Security Council

21 May, 1946

SIR:

In further compliance with the resolutions of the Security Council of 4 April and 8 May, 1946, I have the honour to submit herewith a report of additional information with respect to the matters brought by Iran to the attention of the Security Council.

I remain, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

HUSSEIN ALA
Iranian Ambassador

His Excellency, MR. TRYGVE LIE,
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

21 May, 1946

SIR,

Yesterday I reported on behalf of my Government such information as was available to me up to 5 o'clock in the afternoon of 20 May, 1946, with respect to the question of the evacuation of Soviet troops from the whole of Iran and Soviet inter-

ferences in the internal affairs of my country. I referred to the Commission appointed to make inquiries about conditions in Azerbaijan and have now received further information based upon telegraphic dispatches sent by the members of the Commission in Azerbaijan to my Government in Teheran.

The information as transmitted to me at 4 o'clock this afternoon is, in translation, as follows:

"In order to obtain information on the circumstances of evacuation of all parts of Azerbaijan, I despatched a commission of investigation from Teheran and in the course of one week it investigated carefully the regions of Azerbaijan such as the following important centres: Tabriz and its suburbs, Marand, Julfa, Khoy, Salmas, Maju, Rezacyeh and Miandubab.

The telegraphic reports are to the effect that no trace whatever of Soviet troops, equipment or means of transport was found, and that according to trustworthy, local people, who were questioned in all these places, Soviet troops evacuated Azerbaijan on 6 May."

(Sgd.) Qavam-es-Saltaneh

I have the honour [etc.]

HUSSEIN ALA
Iranian Ambassador

His Excellency, M. ALEXANDRE PARODI,
President of the Security Council

PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ¹

[After Rule 23, printed in BULLETIN of April 21, 1946, p. 663, add the following additional rules. The Annex printed on page 664 remains the same.]

VI. Conduct of Business

Rule 24

The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

Rule 25

The Security Council may appoint a commission or committee or a rapporteur for a specified question.

Rule 26

The President may accord precedence to any rapporteur appointed by the Security Council.

The Chairman of a commission or committee, or

the rapporteur appointed by the commission or committee to present its report, may be accorded precedence for the purpose of explaining the report.

Rule 27

If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling. If it is challenged, the President shall submit his ruling to the Security Council for immediate decision and it shall stand unless overruled.

Rule 28

Proposed resolutions, amendments and substantive motions shall normally be placed before the representatives in writing.

¹ These rules were adopted by the Security Council at its 41st and 42d meetings on May 16 and 17, 1946 (Security Council Document S/62 of 17 May 1946).

Rule 29

Principal motions and draft resolutions shall have precedence in the order of their submission.

Parts of a motion or of a draft resolution shall be voted on separately at the request of any representative, unless the original mover objects.

Rule 30

The following motions shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject before the meeting:

1. to suspend the meeting;
2. to adjourn the meeting;
3. to adjourn the meeting to a certain day or hour;
4. to refer any matter to a committee, to the Secretary-General or to a rapporteur;
5. to postpone discussion of the question to a certain day or indefinitely; or
6. to introduce an amendment.

Any motion for the suspension or for the simple adjournment of the meeting shall be decided without debate.

Rule 31

It shall not be necessary for any motion or draft resolution proposed by a representative on the Security Council to be seconded before being put to a vote.

Rule 32

A motion or draft resolution can at any time be withdrawn, so long as no vote has been taken with respect to it.

If the motion or draft resolution has been seconded, the representative on the Security Council who has seconded it may require that it be put to the vote as his motion or draft resolution with the same right of precedence as if the original mover had not withdrawn it.

Rule 33

If two or more amendments to a motion or draft resolution are proposed, the President shall rule on the order in which they are to be voted upon. Ordinarily, the Security Council shall first vote on the amendment furthest removed in substance from the original proposal and then on the amendment next furthest removed until all amendments have been put to the vote, but when an amendment adds to or deletes from the text of a motion or draft resolution, that amendment shall be voted on first.

Rule 34

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1) of the Charter.

Rule 35

Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding Rule or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council.

Rule 36

The Security Council may invite Members of the Secretariat or other persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence.

VII. Voting*Rule 37*

Voting in the Security Council shall be in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Charter and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

VIII. Languages*Rule 38*

Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages of the Security Council, and English and French the working languages.

Rule 39

Speeches made in either of the working languages shall be interpreted into the other working language.

Rule 40

Speeches made in any of the three other official languages shall be interpreted into both working languages.

Rule 41

Any representative may make a speech in a language other than the official languages. In this case he shall himself provide for interpretation into one of the working languages. Interpretation into the other working language by an interpreter of the Secretariat may be based on the interpretation given in the first working language.

Rule 42

Verbatim records of meetings of the Security Council shall be drawn up in the working languages. At the request of any representative a verbatim record of any speech made in an official language other than the working languages shall be drawn up in the original language.

Rule 43

All resolutions and other important documents shall forthwith be made available in the official languages. Upon the request of any representative, any other document shall be made available in any or all of the official languages.

Rule 44

Documents of the Security Council shall, if the Security Council so decides, be published in any language other than the official languages.

IX. Publicity of Meetings. Records*Rule 45*

Unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public. Any recommendation to the General Assembly regarding the appointment of the Secretary-General shall be discussed and decided at a private meeting.

Rule 46

Subject to the provisions of Rule 48, the verbatim record of each meeting of the Security Council shall be made available in the working languages to the representatives on the Security Council and to the representatives of any other States which have participated in the meeting not later than 10 A.M. of the first working day following the meeting. The verbatim record of any speech made in any other of the official languages, which is drawn up in accordance with the provisions of Rule 42 shall be made available in the same manner to any of the above mentioned representatives at his request.

Rule 47

The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within two working days after the time indicated in Rule 46, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in the verbatim record.

Rule 48

The Security Council may decide that for a private meeting the record shall be made in a single copy alone. This record shall be kept by the Secretary-General. The representatives of the States which have participated in the meeting shall, within a period of ten days, inform the Secretary-General of any corrections they wish to have made in this record.

Rule 49

Corrections that have been requested shall be considered approved unless the President is of the opinion that they are sufficiently important to be submitted to the representatives on the Security Council. In the latter case, the representatives on the Security Council shall submit within two working days any comments they may wish to make. In the absence of objections in this period of time, the record shall be corrected as requested.

Rule 50

The verbatim record referred to in Rule 46 or the record referred to in Rule 48, in which no corrections have been requested in the period of time required by those rules or which has been corrected in accordance with the provision of Rule 49, shall be considered as approved. It shall be signed by the President and shall become the official record of the Security Council.

Rule 51

The official record of public meetings of the Security Council, as well as the documents annexed thereto, shall be published in the official languages as soon as possible.

Rule 52

At the close of each private meeting, the Security Council shall issue a communique through the Secretary-General.

Rule 53

The representatives of the Members of the United Nations which have taken part in a private meeting shall at all times have the right to consult the record of that meeting in the office of the Secretary-General. The Security Council may at any

time grant access to this record to authorized representatives of other Members of the United Nations.

Rule 54

The Secretary-General shall, once each year, submit to the Security Council a list of the records and documents which up to that time have been considered confidential. The Security Council shall decide which of these shall be made available to other Members of the United Nations, which shall be made public, and which shall continue to remain confidential.

X. Admission of New Members

Rule 55

Any State which desires to become a Member of the United Nations shall submit an application to the Secretary-General. This application shall be accompanied by a declaration of its readiness to accept the obligations contained in the Charter.

Rule 56

The Secretary-General shall immediately place the application for membership before the representatives on the Security Council. Unless the Security Council decides otherwise, the application shall be referred by the President to a com-

mittee of the Security Council upon which each member of the Security Council shall be represented. The committee shall examine any application referred to it and report its conclusions thereon to the Council not less than thirty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, or, if a special session of the General Assembly is called, not less than fourteen days in advance of such session.

Rule 57

The Security Council shall decide whether in its judgment the applicant is a peace-loving State, and is able and willing to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, and accordingly whether to recommend the applicant State for membership.

In order to assure the consideration of its recommendation at the next session of the General Assembly following the receipt of the application, the Security Council shall make its recommendations not less than twenty-five days in advance of a regular session of the General Assembly, nor less than four days in advance of a special session.

In special circumstances, the Security Council may decide to make a recommendation to the General Assembly concerning an application for membership subsequent to the expiration of the time limits set forth in the preceding paragraph.

RUSSELL PLAN—Continued from page 931

b. Finished text

- (1) Report cleared for substance by Research Division chief and office director.
- (2) Report cleared editorially by OCL, sent by OCL for reproduction, and distributed in accordance with agreed list.
- (3) Requests for the report received after original distribution to be handled by OCL in consultation with office.

2. Regional Project Requested by a Division of A-B or A-C (e. g. *The 1948-49 Unemployment Level in Germany*)

a. Project initiation

- (1) Prior discussion will normally have taken place between A-C and DRE representatives on the working level.
- (2) Request goes to OCL through A-C representative on subcommittee or through EUR/DRE.
- (3) OCL approves or disapproves after consultation with EUR/DRE and the A-C representative.
- (4) Distribution list agreed by EUR/DRE, A-C, and OCL.

b. Finished text

- (1) Report cleared for substance by DRE and EUR.
- (2) Report cleared editorially by OCL, which arranges reproduction and distribution.

3. An Inter-Regional Project Requested by A-B, A-C, JIC, NIA, or other authorized agency (e. g. *World Opinion on the U. S.*; *Reactions to British Loan in China, France, U. S. S. R.*)

a. Project initiation

- (1) Request goes to OCL.
- (2) OCL, if it approves and is assured of the participation of other interested offices, arranges for a project coordinator from one of the offices or its own staff.
- (3) Project coordinator arranges for cooperation of division analysts through appropriate directors and division chiefs, constructs distribution list.

b. Finished text

- (1) Report approved by appropriate division and office chiefs and by OCL; reproduction and distribution arranged by OCL.

NOTE: Projects 1 and 2 would be done entirely in geographic Research Divisions, except for collaboration of BI on 1.

Project 3 might be done entirely within OCL, but more likely a large contribution of services would be needed from personnel working within their geographic Research Divisions.

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of Meetings

Council of Foreign Ministers:		
Meeting of Deputies	Paris	May 27
Meeting of Foreign Ministers	Paris	April 25—adjourned on May 16 until June 15
Far Eastern Commission	Washington	February 26
Allied-Swiss Negotiations for German External Assets	Washington	March 18
PICAO:		
European and Mediterranean Air Route Services Conference	Paris	April 24
Meeting of the First Annual Assembly	Montreal	May 21
FAO:		
Special Meeting on Urgent Food Problems	Washington	May 20-28
ILO:		
Ninety-eighth Session of the Governing Body	Montreal	May 23-28
Twenty-eighth (Maritime) Session of the International Labor Conference	Seattle	June 6
Inter-American Copyright Conference	Washington	June 1
The United Nations:		
Security Council	New York	March 25
Military Staff Committee	New York	March 25
Special Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons	London	April 8
International Court of Justice	The Hague	Informal Session April 3-May 4 Inaugural Sitting April 18
Commissions of the Economic and Social Council	New York	April 29
Economic and Social Council	New York	May 25
Commission on Atomic Energy	New York	June 14
International Health Conference	New York	June 19
General Assembly: Second Part of First Session	New York	September 3

The dates in the calendar are as of May 26.

Activities and Developments

The Far Eastern Commission on May 23 unanimously approved a policy statement concerning three additional industries, which will form part of the over-all Interim Reparations Removals Program for Japan. These policies, on the machine-tool industry, the sulphuric-acid industry, and the shipbuilding industry, supplement the two initial policy statements which the Commission approved and released to the press last week.¹ The Reparations Committee of the Commission still

has additional policies relating to the Interim Reparations Removals Program under consideration, and the Commission will continue to release these statements as agreement is reached. The Commission has now taken action on six of the 10 industries covered by the Pauley report.

The Commission also unanimously agreed to request its chairman to secure certain information as to the extent to which certain policies and directives relating to civil liberties in Japan had been implemented. The request arose in Committee No. 4 of the Commission, which has been considering the broad subject of civil liberties.

¹ BULLETIN of May 26, 1946, p. 884.

The Commission received on May 17, 1946 the reply of the United States Government to the Commission's earlier policy decision on the subject of "Food Supply for Japan", which was released to the press on April 25, 1946. (Text of Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring's letter printed below.) The steering committee of the Commission considered the reply of the United States Government and unanimously agreed to lay the subject on the table.

May 17, 1946

MY DEAR MR. JOHNSON:

Reference is made to your letter of April 26, 1946 forwarding a policy statement of the Far Eastern Commission with respect to the import of food into Japan, in which the Commission requested the United States Government immediately to review the food import program for Japan in the light of the policy set forth in the statement and in consultation with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the Combined Food Board, and other allocating authorities.

I note that the United States representative on the Commission pointed out that the statement of principles embodied in the first paragraph of the Commission's statement is fully in accord with the principles upon which the United States Government in the past has acted. I wish to reaffirm that statement. So that the Commission may have before it a review of the action taken by the United States Government in implementing those principles, I request that the following information be brought to the attention of the Commission.

In March, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, after having been fully apprised of the severity of the world food crisis, certified that it would be necessary to import an absolute minimum of 200,000 tons of cereal per month from March through June to prevent such disease and unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. According to information supplied by the Supreme Commander, imports of 200,000 tons per month plus indigenous resources still available would provide the non-self-supplying population in Japan with only 800-900 calories per day from May to September. Controlled ration distribution would be still smaller and, any reduction in the 200,000 tons per month would lower the nutrition level still more.

In view of the acute world food shortage which

has produced disastrous conditions even in territories of Allied Powers, the United States Government approved the shipment of 150,000 tons per month from April through June instead of the 200,000 tons asked by the Supreme Commander. Even this program has not been fulfilled. Actual shipments through March amounted to a total of 107,000 tons, while in April only 48,000 tons were shipped. During the same period obligations of the United States for the export of cereal to liberated areas were more fully met than were the commitments for shipment to the Supreme Commander in Japan.

Inevitably there will be a very low level of nutrition in Japan, and the above figures clearly indicate that no preferential treatment or priority has been given to that country.

The Far Eastern Commission has requested the United States Government to review its program. Because of the desperate nature of the crisis and the threatened failure to meet over-all export goals, the entire food program is constantly under review. The resolution of the Commission was kept in mind during the review of the program of May shipments which is now at 25,500 tons of wheat, 82,000 tons of flour and 34,000 tons of other grain. Part of the Japanese allocation must be used to meet emergency needs in Korea. It has also been the practice of this Government to discuss the food program with the Combined Food Board and with its Cereals Committee at which the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and major importing countries are represented, a procedure which was followed in consideration of the May program.

The Far Eastern Commission will be informed if requirements of food imports essential for the safety of the occupying forces in Japan change, or if further review of the program by the United States Government in consultation with the Combined Food Board and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration results in a change in the program for Japan.

Sincerely yours,

For the Acting Secretary of State:

J. H. HILLDRING
Assistant Secretary

Mr. NELSON T. JOHNSON

Secretary General

Far Eastern Commission

ILO: 98th Session of Governing Body¹: The Secretary of State announced on May 22 that the President has approved the designation of Frieda Miller, Director of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, as United States Representative on the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization at its ninety-eighth session which is scheduled to convene at Montreal, Canada, May 23, 1946.

Bernard Wiesman, Chief, International Labor Organization Branch, Division of International

Labor, Social and Health Affairs, Department of State, is accompanying Miss Miller to advise on matters of political, financial, and broad economic concern. Miss Miller and Mr. Wiesman will also attend the session of the Conference Delegation on Constitutional Questions, which will be held in conjunction with the ninety-eighth session, and are now attending the preliminary meetings of the Governing Body Committees which convened at Montreal May 14.

FAO: Special Meeting on Urgent Food Problems²

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by FAO May 20]

I am most happy to welcome to Washington the delegates to the world-wide meeting on urgent food problems that is being convened by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. I wish that it were possible for me actually to be with you to deliver my greeting.

In meeting at this critical period you have heavy responsibilities and great opportunities. What this conference accomplishes or fails to accomplish will make its mark not only in the areas where people are hungry as the aftermath of war, but in all parts of the earth and for a long time to come. Any step toward feeding the world's families better and making the fullest use of the products of farms and fisheries is a step toward winning and securing the peace. Food touches everyone in the world more directly and more keenly than most boundary settlements and other primary political actions that are often local or regional in their effects.

It is not necessary in a message to this group to go into the details of the serious world food situation. Everyone realizes now that the world-wide scarcity of cereals cannot be completely overcome with the 1946 harvest; that deficits in livestock products will continue for a long time. The remaining weeks before the 1946 grain harvest in the Northern Hemisphere are especially critical, and the United States and other countries in a

position to help must continue and heighten their efforts.

In this country we have raised progressively our export program as world needs became more urgent, reducing progressively, at the same time, our own consumption of wheat. In this wheat marketing year we already have shipped more than 300 million bushels of wheat, which is close to 40 percent of the total world exports of wheat. Our export program covering 400 million bushels of wheat for the entire marketing year represents over a third of our total production from the 1945 crop. The people of this country have shown an admirable willingness to do their share in the great humanitarian task of preventing famine in other lands.

During the war we have learned valuable lessons in cooperation with the rest of the world. What the people of this country have done is ample evidence that they recognize the necessity for progressive and effective action in achieving for the world, freedom from want, that they are conscious of the world's needs and are ready to cooperate in a program to meet them. In my message to the conference at Quebec, where FAO was established last fall, I said that my country's delegation came "prepared to work together with the delegations of other nations for the good of all, and to bear their full share of the responsibility for a successful outcome."

We bring the same spirit to this conference, which I view as the first great test for FAO. I extend to all the delegates present, and to FAO's great director-general, Sir John Boyd Orr, my best wishes for success.

HARRY TRUMAN

¹ Released to the press May 22.

² Meeting in Washington from May 20 to 28. The President's statement was made at the first meeting.

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL¹

There are certain issues on which decisions must be taken without delay. I suggest that the conference should consider these:

1. How the 1946 harvest can be husbanded to cover the period until the next harvest; how it can be used to the best advantage and distributed according to needs. Decisions on this should be taken before the first blade of grain is cut.

2. How to get maximum production in the 1947 harvest. Decisions must be taken immediately for the autumn sowings, and arrangements must be made for priority for fertilizers and equipment needed to provide the food to save life, with the same sense of urgency as was shown in the production of munitions during the war. This is a war against starvation and we must have the weapons to fight it.

3. Then arrangements must be made to keep the whole position under continuous review and to keep the governments and people of the world informed from time to time of what the position is so that action can be taken immediately on the appearance of any adverse factor affecting production or distribution. This is the intelligence service in the war against hunger, and it can operate efficiently only if all governments are prepared to give full information.

4. Consideration must also be given to the machinery for facilitating the procurement of food and its allocation on an equitable basis, and also for advising governments on programs of production. The functions of the present organizations must be coordinated in a single international organization, probably on the lines recommended by the Director-General of UNRRA. This organization must have the resources and the authority to deal with the whole anticipated period of the food shortage.

There is another aspect which must be kept in view. The measures taken to meet the present emergency must as far as possible be such as may merge smoothly into a permanent world food policy. In this connection I hope that it will be possible to make arrangements, either through deferred payments, long-term credits, or other means, so that relief measures may as soon as pos-

sible be put on a business footing. No nation which for a long period depends upon the charity of another nation for food for its citizens can retain its self-respect.

Existing International Organizations Concerned With Food and Agriculture

The Combined Food Board consists of representatives of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The function of the Board is to make recommendations as to the allocation of scarce foodstuffs and fertilizers. The recommendations are based upon the reports of its 13 commodity committees, which include representatives of the main importing and exporting countries for the commodities covered. (The Board was scheduled to terminate its work on June 30, but the date has now been set forward to December 31, 1946).²

The Emergency Economic Committee for Europe consists of representatives of several European governments. A subcommittee of the Council is concerned with the food and agricultural problems of Europe.³

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations is the permanent international organization set up by the United Nations to deal with the problems of food and agriculture. Its objectives include increased consumption, increased production, stabilization of prices, and adequate returns for producers. FAO can supply information and advise governments and other international organizations, but has no executive powers.

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration is the international emergency relief agency, and its field of operations is restricted to those countries devastated by the war and unable to pay for supplies. (It is contemplated that UNRRA will complete its shipments to the receiving countries in Europe not later than the end of 1946 and in the Far East three months thereafter.)

¹ Made by Sir John Boyd Orr before the Special Meeting on Urgent Food Problems in Washington on May 20.

² See joint statement by the President and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada as printed in *BULLETIN* of May 19, 1946, p. 861.

³ For a recent review by the ECE see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 17, 1946, p. 248.

The Record of the Week

Report by the Secretary of State on the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers¹

I wish to talk with you about the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Paris. On that mission I was accompanied by Senator Connally, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Vandenberg, a Republican member of that Committee. I cannot adequately express my appreciation of their wise counsel and loyal cooperation. Senator Connally was exceedingly helpful. Senator Vandenberg by his wholehearted cooperation let the world know that regardless of how much he and his party may disagree with the administration about domestic issues, in our relations with foreign governments we have but one policy, the policy of the United States.

Building the foundations of a people's peace in a war-shattered world is a long, hard process. A people's peace cannot be won by flashing diplomatic triumphs. It requires patience and firmness, tolerance and understanding. We must not try to impose our will on others, but we must make sure that others do not get the impression they can impose their will on us.

The progress made towards peace at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was disappointingly small in light of the expectations we had when it was agreed at Moscow last December that the Council should resume the work which had been interrupted by our inability to agree at London last September.

But the progress towards peace at Paris was

infinitely greater than I expected when I suggested that the Council should meet in Paris preparatory to the prompt calling of a peace conference. The Ministers did come to Paris seriously intending to pave the way for a peace conference. We differed considerably on a number of fundamental points; but we did come to know what those fundamental points were and the varying weight the different Ministers attached to those points.

We found that there were three basic issues outstanding on the Italian treaty: reparations, the colonies and the Italian-Yugoslav boundary, particularly as it concerns the Italian city of Trieste.

In summarizing the significance of these basic issues, I shall deliberately seek to avoid intensifying the conflict in viewpoints.

Our position on reparations is simple. To enable the Italian nation to live we have already advanced directly or indirectly \$900,000,000. We should prefer in the interest of peace to forget about reparations. But we are willing to agree to limited reparations, provided these do not deprive Italy of resources necessary to enable her to subsist without external assistance.

If Italy requires help from others she will look to us. And we made it clear we are not going to advance millions of dollars to enable Italy to produce goods to be paid as reparations to any of our Allies.

The Soviet Government has insisted on reparations for itself of \$100,000,000. We have pointed out certain sources from which reparations can be taken which would not seriously affect the Italian economy and which would yield substantially the amount which the Soviets claim. But the Soviet Government is unwilling to count what she will obtain from some of these sources as reparations.

For example, she insists that some of the naval ships surrendered by Italy to the navies of the

¹ A radio address delivered by the Secretary of State on the occasion of his return from the Paris Conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States which took place between April 25 and May 16, 1946. The address was broadcast over the national networks of the American Broadcasting Company and the National Broadcasting Company on May 20, 1946. The address was rebroadcast, by transcription, over the Mutual Broadcasting Company and released to the press on the same date.

United States and Britain be shared with her. She declares the ships are war booty. But war booty belongs to the nation capturing it. The Soviet Union has never shared with Allied Nations any war booty captured by her. We are willing to give to her in lieu of reparations some of the naval ships surrendered to us. She demands the ships but refuses to consider them as a substitute for reparations. She insists upon being paid out of current production. We would have to finance the production, and therefore I refused to agree to the proposal.

Differences regarding the colonies have been narrowed but not resolved. The Soviet Government receded from its claim for a trusteeship of Tripolitania, first in favor of a joint Soviet-Italian trusteeship and later in favor of an Italian trusteeship as originally proposed by the French.

Our position has always been that the colonies should be placed under United Nations trusteeship, having as its objective the welfare of the inhabitants and their independence at the earliest practicable date. The Trusteeship Council should appoint a neutral administrator responsible to it, thus avoiding all possible rivalry between the powers. Libya and Eritrea should be granted independence in ten years.

It is open to question whether Italy is in an economic position to assume the responsibility of trusteeship and whether the return of the colonies to Italy as trustee takes sufficiently into account the wishes of the inhabitants. For these reasons it was with considerable reluctance that I indicated my willingness to yield to the French suggestion of an Italian trusteeship if that would bring about an agreement in the Council, and if it were agreed that a definite date would be fixed for the independence of Libya and Eritrea. But the French Government was unwilling to agree to a fixed date for independence.

The British felt that because of their promises during the war they could not agree to an Italian trusteeship for territory occupied by the Senussi tribes. For security reasons they also proposed a British trusteeship for Cyrenaica.

When no agreement was reached, I again urged the original American proposal for a United Nations trusteeship.

It was my impression that agreement on reparations and the colonies as well as on a host of other questions would not be long delayed if only a solution of the Trieste problem could be found.

The Soviet Representative finally indicated that there would be no serious question on the cession of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece but he refused to approve it until the other territorial dispositions could be agreed upon.

The experts appointed to investigate the Italian-Yugoslav frontier did not differ as to the facts. But the Soviet Representative differs from the other members of the Council as to the conclusions to be drawn from the facts. It is his position that Venezia Giulia must be treated as an inseparable whole, and that so treated the claim of Yugoslavia to the area is superior to that of Italy. The other representatives believe that wise statesmanship as well as the explicit decision taken by the Council at London requires a boundary line which will in the main be an ethnic line leaving a minimum of people under alien rule.

It was wrong to give Italy the whole of Venezia Giulia after World War I. It would be equally wrong to give Yugoslavia the whole of Venezia Giulia now. It would transfer from Italy to Yugoslavia approximately 500,000 Italians.

The British and French experts proposed ethnic lines more favorable to Yugoslavia than our own. In an effort to reach agreement we stated we were willing to accept the British or French line or any other ethnic line that could be justified upon the basis of the London decision.

The American Delegation suggested a plebiscite for the area between the line proposed by the United States and the line proposed by the Soviet Union—but the Soviet Delegation would not consider a plebiscite except for the whole Venezia Giulia area. All of us are agreed that Yugoslavia and the countries of Central Europe which have for years used the port of Trieste shall have free access to Trieste at which there shall be a free port under international control. But we will continue to appeal to the Soviet Government and the Yugoslav Government not to press for a boundary line which will needlessly violate ethnic principles and will breed trouble in the future.

Agreement on the Balkan treaties is blocked principally by the inability of the Council to agree upon the economic clauses. Agreement on these provisions may have been delayed as part of a bargaining process, although so far the Soviet Government has stood out against the inclusion in the treaties of any provision which would promise freedom of commerce on the Danube, the gateway to Central Europe.

If the Soviet Government is opposed, as the United States Government is opposed, to the formation of exclusive political and economic blocs, they will not persist in their refusal to permit the countries of Central Europe to open their gates to the commerce of all nations.

It is regrettable that our outstanding differences on the treaties could not have been adjusted at our recent meeting in Paris. A short recess to allow a calm re-examination of our respective positions should expedite agreement when we reconvene. But when a world short of goods and short of food is crying for the return of conditions of peace, we cannot indefinitely delay the making of peace and the withdrawal of troops from occupied areas. The four Allied governments cannot indefinitely delay the making of peace with countries which they have long ceased to fight, simply because they cannot agree among themselves on peace terms. The Council of Foreign Ministers was formed to facilitate and not obstruct the making of peace.

It was for that reason that the American Delegation proposed that the Council at its next meeting on June 15 should conclude as far as possible its work on the proposed drafts, but that the date for the peace conference should be definitely fixed for July 1 or July 15 and invitations should be issued at once.

It was our view that the Council had taken sufficient time to try to narrow their differences and at this stage with the principal issues defined, we should not deny to our other war partners their right to participate. The making of peace is not the exclusive prerogative of any four governments.

The Soviet Delegation insisted that invitations for the conference could not be sent until we had reconvened and agreed on all fundamental questions. Unanimous agreement was necessary and we were forced, therefore, to recess without agreement for the actual calling of the peace conference.

While the American Delegation will, when the Council reconvenes, make every effort to reach agreement on fundamental questions, it will renew its demand for the calling of a peace conference on July 1 or July 15.

If we cannot have a peace conference until the four nations agree on every subject deemed fundamental by any one of them, that will give to one member of the Council the power to stop all efforts toward peace. It would be better for the Council

to submit to the peace conference a single draft of each treaty and to set forth in this draft both the matters on which agreement had been reached and those on which agreement had not been reached. This would permit free discussion in the peace conference by all the nations that did the fighting, and world opinion will then point the way to a final settlement.

If a peace conference is not called this summer, the United States will feel obliged to request the General Assembly of the United Nations under Article 14 of the Charter to make recommendations with respect to the peace settlements. But I confidently expect a peace conference to be called this summer.

The situation which we will face in the coming months will be a test not only of others but of ourselves. There are now and there will be in the future many occasions which might impel us to say as we did after the last war that, much as we would like to cooperate in the restoration of Europe, cooperation as a practical matter is impossible without the sacrifice of our principles and that we must be content to cultivate and defend our own hemisphere.

But we must not forget that if we fail to cooperate in a peace which is indivisible we may again find that we will have to cooperate in a war which is world-wide. Whether we like it or not, we live in one world.

I am unwilling to admit that we cannot cooperate without sacrifice of our principles. If we are going to play our part we must take the offensive for peace as we took the offensive for war.

But the victories of peace like those of war require sacrifice not of principle but for principle. They require faith in ourselves and in our ideals. They require initiative, resourcefulness, and unrelenting effort. There is no iron curtain that the aggregate sentiments of mankind cannot penetrate.

The American Delegation at Paris did not hesitate to start the offensive for peace.

Security is the concern of every nation. But the effort of one nation to increase its security may threaten the security of other nations and cause them in turn to try to increase their own security. The quest for security may lead to less rather than more security in the world.

It is in truth extremely difficult to know to what extent the action of any nation may be ascribed to its quest for security or to its desire to expand.

But some so-called security moves on the diplomatic checkerboard have not contributed to a general sense of security.

Many of these moves are said to originate in the fear of the revival of German military might.

On our way to Potsdam last summer President Truman and I discussed this situation and agreed that it should be American policy to disarm Germany and keep her disarmed and to do what we can to prevent a struggle between the powers for the control of Germany which might give Germany the chance to divide and conquer.

Those principles were stated in the Potsdam agreement. But President Truman and I thought at that time that the policy of disarming Germany and keeping Germany disarmed for a definite period of years should become a part of a solemn treaty between the principal Allied powers. Our policy should be to prevent war and not to wait until aggression gets out of hand.

It was not a new thought. It had been foreshadowed in the Moscow Declaration of 1943. Others had discussed it, but no one more forcefully than Senator Vandenberg in a speech in the Senate in January, 1945.

At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the Soviet Foreign Secretary seemed greatly concerned about the Soviet security requirements in the Balkans, I suggested a twenty-five year four-power treaty, to keep Germany disarmed as a means of preventing any real threat to Soviet security. I explained that we contemplated a similar joint guaranty of the disarmament of Japan.

I again proposed such a treaty in a talk with Generalissimo Stalin on December 24 while I was in Moscow. The Generalissimo said that if the United States made such a proposal he would whole-heartedly support it.

Later I also spoke to Mr. Bevin who advised me that he personally was most sympathetic to the suggestion.

In February I sent a working draft of the proposed treaty for German disarmament to the Soviet, British and the French Governments and the proposed treaty for Japanese disarmament to the Soviet, British and Chinese Governments. I invited their suggestions as to the draft.

I was informed by Mr. Bevin and M. Bidault that they favored the proposal in principle but

would have a few suggestions to make. I did not hear from Mr. Molotov. Just before the Paris meeting I advised the Ministers I would like to discuss the proposal at Paris. The Soviet Minister agreed to discuss it informally but stated without specification that there were serious objections to the draft.

At Paris the Soviet Representative stated he first wanted to know if Germany was being disarmed as contemplated by the Potsdam agreement and he feared the treaty might delay immediate disarmament. I pointed out that our proposal could not fairly be so construed; that it did not lessen the obligation to disarm Germany now but provided machinery to keep Germany disarmed.

To remove any question as to our purpose I asked General Clay to request the Allied Control Council to appoint representatives with power to go into every zone and make a report as to the disarmament of Germany.

Later the Soviet Representative stated that when Generalissimo Stalin agreed with me to support the treaty I did not have a draft of it. He said that as it could not become effective until after a German treaty was signed, consideration of it could be delayed.

It is our sincere hope that after the Soviet Union studies our proposal and comes to appreciate our earnest desire to see Germany disarmed and kept disarmed, the Soviet Union will support it whole-heartedly.

While the making of the German peace settlement may take some time, we took the initiative at Paris to propose the immediate appointment of special deputies to prepare a peace settlement which could be considered at a general Allied conference, the date of which should be fixed by the Council at its next session.

While there is no German government yet which could accept the settlement, agreement among the Allies on the nature of the settlement is necessary to enable the Allies to know the goal towards which the Allied occupation and administration should be directed and the kind of German government which should be created to accept the settlement.

I also asked that the Special Deputies on Germany be instructed to report on several pressing problems, including boundary and economic questions. We cannot, for example, continue to carry out the reparation program if Germany is not to

be administered as an economic unit as agreed upon at Potsdam. Whatever boundaries are agreed upon for Germany, she must be able to subsist without external assistance. We cannot subsidize Germany to enable her to pay reparations to other nations.

I regret that the Soviet Representative was not prepared to act upon my proposal for the appointment of Special Deputies without further study. I shall renew my proposal when the Council reconvenes.

Important as the German questions are and eager as we are to press for their speedy solution, we must not and cannot delay the peace settlements with other countries. At Potsdam it was agreed that the start should be made with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland. While Germany must remain under occupation for some time, we cannot fail to do our part to rid the rest of Europe of the burden of the forces of occupation. There can be no recovery in Europe until we do.

It is particularly important that we press forward vigorously with the Austrian treaty. The Moscow Declaration on Austria contemplated that Austria should be regarded more as a liberated than as a satellite country. It was agreed at Potsdam that no reparations would be taken from her. She was one of the first countries in Central Europe to have free elections following the liberation. The continuance of foreign troops in Austria is an undue burden on her economy.

In February we asked that the Austrian treaty be prepared along with other treaties for satellite states. At Paris I insisted upon its preparation but the Soviet Representative declined to discuss the Austrian treaty or say when he would consider it.

The making of peace with Austria is essential to the restoration of anything like conditions of peace in Europe. As long as there is no peace with Austria and foreign troops remain on her soil, military communication lines will continue to be maintained in Rumania and Hungary and possibly Italy.

If peace could be made with Austria concurrently with the treaties now under consideration,

there would be no necessity or excuse for a single soldier on foreign soil in Europe with the exception of Germany and a line of communication through Poland. European States would have a chance to live and breathe.

It is American policy to press unremittingly for the conclusion of peace settlements to make possible the withdrawal of troops from countries where they do not belong and where they impose unjustified economic and social difficulties upon the people. And even without waiting for the conclusion of peace treaties it is American policy to press for the reduction of occupation troops in all countries.

Our policy of continuing to press for the return of conditions of peace, without regard to the making of formal peace treaties, finally yielded some constructive results in the case of Italy. For months we have been urging the revision of the Italian armistice so as to restore virtually complete sovereignty to Italy except in the colonies and in the controversial Venezia Giulia area. At Paris this revision was agreed to.

While the absence of a peace treaty still handicaps Italy in her effort to rebuild her broken economic and political life, the revised armistice gives the Italian Government the largest possible freedom that can be given to it without a formal peace treaty.

Our problems are serious, but I am not discouraged. Our offensive to secure peace has only begun. We are determined to work for political and economic peace in Europe, in the Near East and in the rest of the world. We shall work for it in the peace conferences and in the councils of the United Nations. The objective of our offensive is not territory or reparations for the United States. The objective is peace—not a peace founded upon vengeance or greed, but a just peace, the only peace that can endure.

Prosecution of War Criminals

The British Foreign Office has informed the Department that India and Uruguay have acceded to the agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis signed at London August 8, 1945.¹ The accession was effective for India on December 22, 1945 and for Uruguay on December 11, 1945.

¹ Executive Agreement Series 472. BULLETIN, Aug. 12, 1945, p. 222.

Allied-Swiss Negotiations

AGREEMENT OF FRENCH, BRITISH, AND U.S. DELEGATIONS WITH THE SWISS DELEGATION

[Released to the press May 21]

The Delegations of France, Great Britain, and the United States have arrived at agreement with the Swiss Delegation on two fundamental questions with which they have been concerned during the past several weeks. The decisions relate to the division of German holdings in Switzerland and to gold received by Switzerland from Germany.

The agreement is in general terms, and some details remain to be worked out in Washington on a technical level.

The accord provides that:

(1) Holdings of Germans in Germany or Germans subject to repatriation will be identified and liquidated or transferred to persons acceptable to all concerned. This work will be done by a Swiss agency, which the Swiss Government will set up. The Swiss agency will cooperate with a joint commission composed of representatives of the three Allied Governments and of Switzerland. Doubtful or controversial cases will be referred to arbitration.

(2) The proceeds of liquidation will be divided equally between the Allies as trustees for the countries claiming reparations, and Switzerland. On their side, the Allies will turn the funds they obtain over to the Inter-Allied Reparation Agency for the rehabilitation of countries devastated or depleted by Germany. Procedure for the distribution of these funds was provided in the Paris Reparation Agreement signed in Paris in January of this year.

(3) The Allies will accept a payment of 250,000,000 Swiss francs in consideration of which the governments signatory to the Paris Reparation Agreement will waive their claim and those of their central banks for restitution from Switzerland of monetary gold. This amount will also be divided in accordance with the Paris Reparation Agreement. The amount equals approximately \$58,140,000.

The accord reached on the above questions provides the basis for concluding in the near future

the negotiations which began in Washington on March 18. It provides a satisfactory method of preventing the use of German assets for the financing of a new war. It also settles amicably differences of principle between the Allies and the Swiss on the gold issue and the allocation of the proceeds of liquidation.

The negotiations are being conducted by Walter Stucki for the Swiss Government, Paul Chargue-raud for the French Government, F. W. McCombe for the British Government, and Randolph Paul, Special Assistant to the President, for the United States Government.

Appointment of U.S. Representative for Negotiations on German External Assets

[Released to the press May 24]

The appointment of Seymour J. Rubin as the United States representative for the forthcoming Allied-neutral negotiations on the subject of German external assets and related problems was announced on May 24.

Mr. Rubin will take the place of Randolph Paul in negotiations with neutral countries other than Switzerland. Substantial agreement on the Swiss negotiations has already been announced, and other commitments make it impossible for Mr. Paul to conduct further negotiations.

Mr. Rubin is Deputy Director of the Office of Economic Security Policy in the Department of State. He has been closely associated with Mr. Paul in the conduct of the negotiations with a Delegation of the Swiss Government. Mr. Rubin's duties in the Department of State have concerned questions of German holdings in other countries, and he participated in the Potsdam Conference as a member of the staff of Ambassador Edwin W. Pauley.

Confirmations

Philippine War Damage Commission

On May 22, 1946 the Senate confirmed the nominations of Francisco A. Delgado, Frank A. Waring, and John S. Young to be members of the Philippine War Damage Commission.

U. S. and British Governments To Consult With Arab Leaders on Palestine¹

[Released to the press May 21]

The Department of State announced on May 21 that the Government of the United States, in conjunction with the British Government, has taken steps to initiate the consultations with Jewish and Arab leaders regarding Palestine to which both Governments have been committed.

Instructions were issued to American representatives in the Near East to furnish on May 20 copies of the Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to certain governments and organizations, together with copies of a memorandum outlining this Government's position in the matter, and to state that this Government would appreciate receiving within thirty days the views of the interested parties relative to the Report. Concurrent action has been taken by British representatives at the Near Eastern capitals. On May 20, the Department of State also addressed letters to certain American organizations, which have shown a particular interest in the problem of Palestine, with a similar request for their views.

The governments and organizations which the American Government has approached in this connection are: The governments of Egypt, Iraq,

Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Trans-Jordan and the Yemen, the Arab Higher Committee, the League of Arab States, the Jewish Agency, the American Zionist Emergency Council, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Conference, the American Council for Judaism, the American Jewish Congress, the Institute for Arab American Affairs, Agudas Israel of America, the New Zionist Organization of America, and the American League for a Free Palestine.

The Department's letters to the organizations in this country and the memoranda transmitted by this Government to the interested governments and organizations listed above read as follows:

May 20, 1946.

SIRS:

I am enclosing under instructions from the President a copy of the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, together with a memorandum outlining certain considerations which have prompted the Government of the United States to consult Jewish and Arab representatives regarding this report.

I should be glad to receive any comments or suggestions which your organization may wish to furnish regarding the various matters discussed in the report of the Committee, and I need hardly assure you that the views of your organization will receive the close attention of this Government. It would be appreciated if the comments and suggestions of the interested parties, which it is hoped may be of a constructive nature, might be received within thirty days from today.

Very truly yours,

For the Secretary of State:

DEAN ACHESON

Under Secretary

[Enclosure]

MEMORANDUM

In inviting comments and suggestions on the report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, the Government of the United States desires to make the following observations:

¹ The Department of State has been asked the question whether the statement of May 10 of the then Acting Secretary of State regarding the initiation of consultation with Jews and Arabs on the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine represents a withdrawal from the statement issued by the President on Apr. 30.

In reply the Department said on May 22 that there is no conflict and can be no conflict in the two statements. It must be clear that the President's statements are controlling upon all the departments of government. In his statement of Apr. 30 the President reaffirmed the urgency of the transference of the 100,000 Jews as recommended by the Committee and previously by him.

It is precisely because of the urgency of this problem that, under the direction of the President, the State Department has agreed to and inaugurated immediate consultations with Jews and Arabs as well as with the British Government as the best and quickest means of reaching an effective solution of the problems dealt with in the report.

1. The report is advisory in character; consequently, its recommendations are not binding. However, the United States Government is giving careful consideration to the report in view of the standing of the members of the Committee, of the fact that the report was unanimously approved by them and of the fact that they were entirely free to arrive at any conclusions which to them seemed fair and reasonable. The United States Government will also give careful consideration to the views of the Governments and organizations which it is now consulting. Judging from preliminary reactions to the report in various quarters, criticism is to be expected. In view of the importance of this problem and the sincere desire of the United States to arrive at a policy with regard to Palestine which will be both humane and just, this Government greatly hopes that the general character and trend of the observations and suggestions may, so far as possible, be of a constructive nature.

2. By means of the participation of American citizens in the work of the Committee, and through the present consultation, the Government of the United States is seeking information and assistance looking to the formulation of its policy on several difficult and complex problems. It readily recognizes that other Governments and organizations will have their own respective attitudes in regard to these questions which may or may not be similar to the attitude which shall be adopted by the United States. The United States Government is grateful for the cooperation and help which have already been accorded to the Committee of Inquiry and hopes that assistance and collaboration will continue to be forthcoming as these matters develop. The United States Government, for its part, will be prepared at all times to reciprocate to the best of its ability the many courtesies which have been afforded to its citizens and representatives by the interested governments and groups.

3. The interest of the United States in the questions considered in the report is believed to be legitimate and is based upon the following:

(a) Compassion for and a desire to assist victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution, both Jews and non-Jews.

(b) The fact that for a number of years American citizens have been contributing substantial assistance to the upbuilding of the Jewish

National Home in Palestine, and that there is every reason to expect that their interest will continue.

(c) The deep interest which the American Government and its citizens have in maintaining and promoting mutually beneficial and harmonious relations between the United States and the countries of the Near East in the political field, in education and other cultural activities, in trade, and in economic development.

(d) The value placed by the United States upon the contributions which the Near Eastern countries have made and will doubtless continue to make to the cause of world peace and prosperity and to the upbuilding and effectiveness of the international organization created for these purposes.

4. This Government will be glad to receive comments and suggestions regarding the report as a whole or any part of it, and would be grateful if these could be received, at the latest, thirty days from today.

Shipments of Grain to India

[Released to the press May 24]

It has been said that the United States has supplied no grain to India. This is incorrect, since 105,000 tons of grains and flours were shipped from the United States to India during the first four months of 1946 and further shipments of 59,500 tons of American grain to India are planned for May. Shipments from the United States are programmed in the light of information developed in discussions with representatives of other major supplying countries concerning their export programs. American attempts to alleviate famine in India and other countries are thus coordinated with similar efforts by Great Britain and Canada, Australia, and a number of other countries. A few weeks ago the United Kingdom agreed to divert shipments and reduce its stocks of wheat by 200,000 tons, thus making available 60,000 tons to India alone. This was made possible only because the United States guaranteed to replace, after July 1, the amounts withdrawn from British supplies to meet the present emergency. Geographic location is, of course, an important factor in accounting for the sources from which importing countries obtain supplies. For example, a large portion of

Australian wheat goes to India rather than to Europe, since the United States is nearer to Europe than is Australia.

There appears to be a mistaken but wide-spread belief in India that the Combined Food Board agreed to make 1,400,000 tons of wheat and wheat substitutes available to India during the first half of 1946. No six months' allocation has been made to any country, wheat shipments being programmed for a month at a time by the major exporting countries on the basis of information made available to the Combined Food Board and its Cereals Committee. Belief that a 1,400,000-ton allocation was made to India apparently arose from a misunderstanding of a tentative wheat-distribution table under discussion but not formally presented when the Government of India Food Delegation met with the Combined Food Board in March. It was explained at the time that the proposed distribution table did not in any sense represent agreed figures of the Combined Food Board Cereals Committee and was not to be regarded as an allocation. In fact the tentative nature of the table was indicated by its failure to present a complete balance between available supplies and indicated distribution.

In the Combined Food Board Rice Committee the United States has collaborated with seven other countries in planning the world distribution of all significant export surpluses of rice. The Government of India has recently accepted membership on this committee and is now participating directly in its activities. The difficulties confronting this group during the first six months of 1946 are indicated by comparison of world import requirements for this period of 3,454,000 metric tons of milled rice with export availabilities of only one third as much, namely 1,139,000 metric tons. Rice is the major staple grain in the customary diet of a considerable portion of the population of the southern United States. Yet, for the months of April-June when the United States had 133,000 metric tons to allocate, it assigned only 23,000 to United States civilians.

As announced on May 9,¹ the United States has associated itself with the Governments of Siam and the United Kingdom in a Rice Commission to supervise and expedite the orderly and maximum movement of Siamese rice exports in accordance with Combined Food Board requirements.

¹ BULLETIN of May 19, 1946, p. 863.

In the Department's press release concerning the Rice Commission, for the establishment of which this government has been pressing for many months, it was stated that:

"This Government from the first regretted the principle embraced in this free-rice demand, and has long felt that this was one of the most serious impediments which has delayed the procurement of Siamese rice so urgently needed in India, China, Malaya, the Philippines, and other areas in the Far East. This delay has been especially unfortunate as Siam is the only country in the Far East with any substantial exportable surplus of rice."

In addition it was pointed out that the United States has been active and successful in arranging for the supply of transportation equipment needed to move Siamese rice, and for textiles badly needed as an incentive for the production and marketing of this rice so necessary in Far Eastern areas such as India. The United States has also been active in arranging for the transfer to Burma of transportation facilities required for the movement of Burmese rice.

The attitude of the United States Government toward the Indian food situation was summarized as follows in a recent communication from the President of the United States to the Viceroy of India:

"You may be sure that the gravity of the food shortage in India is thoroughly recognized by the United States Government and is receiving the fullest and most sympathetic consideration on the highest levels of the government."

Herbert Hoover To Visit Other American Republics

[Released to the press by the White House May 23]

At the request of President Truman, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Honorary Chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee, will leave Saturday, May 25, on a trip to the other American republics. Included in the party are—

HUGH GIBSON, formerly American Ambassador to Brazil, Belgium, and Poland;

JULIUS KLEIN, formerly Assistant Secretary of Commerce;

D. A. FITZGERALD, U. S. Department of Agriculture food expert;

MAURICE PATE, an executive of the International Red Cross; and

FRANK MASON, who will act as press assistant for the party.

Mr. Hoover plans to arrive in Mexico City on Sunday, May 26, and after spending several days there, to proceed to Panama, arriving on the 29th. The itinerary from that point will depend on weather conditions, the progress of Mr. Hoover's discussions, and other factors, but it is tentatively planned to proceed down the west coast of South America and return along the east coast of that continent. It is expected that the party will return to Washington about June 22.

In each of the countries visited, Mr. Hoover will discuss ways in which the other American republics may participate in alleviating the critical famine conditions prevalent in large areas of the world. This will include a review of the import requirements of each country visited. In those cases where surplus production is available, Mr.

Hoover will offer each nation an opportunity to make its full contribution to the relief of world distress. The program that Mr. Hoover will discuss is a broad one, and he is confident that each of the other American republics will want to share in all ways that are available to them.

Transfer of Lend-Lease Functions

On May 17, 1946 the President signed Executive Order 9726¹ transferring all functions with respect to the maintenance of accounts and other fiscal records relating to lend-lease and reverse lend-lease matters from the Department of State to the Treasury Department, which functions shall be administered under the supervision and direction of the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department of State shall continue to administer all other functions relating to the administration of the act which are now under its jurisdiction.

ALLEN—Continued from page 927.

IV

The above discussion of the relationship between regional systems and the world organization has been confined to matters in the field of security, because it is only in this field that the Charter contains specific guides. It is silent on the powers of and relations with regional arrangements and agencies in the economic, social, and cultural fields. Certain criticisms have been leveled at the Charter for this omission.

It may, however, be pointed out that certain indirect guides do emerge from the Charter for solving problems of organizational relationship between regional and world-wide agencies in other than the security field. Not only may the pattern of security relationships discussed be considered as a general frame of reference for working out non-security relations, but likewise those Articles (57 and 63) which provide for bringing world-wide specialized organizations into relationship with the United Nations through special agreements with the Security Council may furnish helpful analogy for the relations of regional agencies in the economic, cultural, and other fields with both their world-wide counterparts and the organs of the United Nations themselves. However, the

complex of such agencies included, for example, within the inter-American system suggests a host of problems of relationship for which gradual solutions will have to be found. It will be a task primarily for the Economic and Social Council to seek to mark out the general lines along which it is believed that these relationships might be worked out. With respect to inter-American agencies, the Ninth International Conference of American States will occupy itself with these problems from the regional point of view.

Beyond these organizational problems of relationship in the non-security field, however, lie the deeper issues of the economic and commercial aspects of regionalism. Again the Charter, perforce because it was setting up a political organization, does not touch upon these; and consideration of this complex field is beyond the scope of the present article. Nevertheless, a realization of the significant role of economic factors in the conscious development or discouragement of tendencies favoring or opposing a regional approach to international security relations is necessary to give perspective to the political and security aspects of regionalism sketched in this discussion.

¹ 11 Federal Register 5437.

Invalidity of Commercial Agreements

Czechoslovakia

The American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia has transmitted to the Department a translation of a Notice of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs of February 4, 1946, as published February 19, 1946 under No. 27 of the Collection of Czechoslovak Laws and Decrees, which declares the invalidity of commercial agreements between Czechoslovakia and enemy countries.

The Notice declares that "all the commercial treaties, agreements and conventions including supplementary agreements and protocols between the Czechoslovak Republic on one side and Germany, Italy, Hungary, Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania and Japan on the other side are considered invalid since the outbreak of war and are, therefore, no more in effect in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic since the state of war existed with the signatories", and that "all the commercial treaties, agreements and conventions including the supplementary agreements and protocols concluded at the time of serfdom by unconstitutional organs exercising power in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic, are also invalid."

Opportunity for Study at the University of Montevideo

[Released to the press April 29]

The Department of State has recently been informed by the American Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay, that the University of Montevideo has approved a new statute which provides for the acceptance by the University of graduate students from the other American republics, including the United States. This action of the University is in response to an increased number of requests from American students.

The University of Montevideo will accept qualified American students for one or more courses and will issue official certificates for the successful completion of the courses.

Students interested in attending the University of Montevideo under the provisions of this new statute should apply direct to the University.

UNRRA Mission to Turkey

[Released to the press by UNRRA May 18]

A diplomatic mission of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration to Turkey, which recently became the forty-eighth member nation of UNRRA, is flying to Ankara to discuss with that country problems of supply and the best means by which Turkey can cooperate with UNRRA. The mission will also visit Egypt, Iraq, and Iran to discuss similar matters with the governments of those countries.

Headed by Cornelius Van H. Engert of Berkeley, Calif., acting diplomatic adviser, the mission consists of Ira Hirschmann of New York, N.Y., special consultant; George Mason of Canada, supply negotiator and procurement coordinator; and Jessie Story of Canada, secretary.

Agriculturist To Visit in Other American Republics

Skuli Rutford of St. Paul, Minn., is one of a group of distinguished educators who has received a travel grant under the program administered by the Department of State for the exchange of professors and technical experts between this country and the other American republics.

At present on leave from his post as Assistant State Director of Extension in Minnesota, Mr. Rutford will confer with agricultural officials and technicians in certain Latin American countries concerning current problems in the collaborative programs between the United States and these republics to promote production of complementary and strategic crops. He will also consult with such officials and technicians concerning the training of personnel in the technical phases of agriculture in order that the training program, as now provided by extension for foreign nationals, can be improved. He will also spend some time visiting selected agricultural areas in order to familiarize himself with the agricultural problems in these countries. The program of activities for Mr. Rutford has been planned with the cooperation of the United States Department of Agriculture.

Mr. Rutford will proceed to Guatemala for six weeks and before returning to the United States will visit El Salvador, Peru, and Mexico. He expects to be gone approximately 18 weeks.

American Students To Participate in Archaeological Excavations in Great Britain

[Released to the press May 21]

Through the American Council of Learned Societies, the London Institute of Archaeology has invited 25 American students to participate in archaeological excavations which are to be made in the "blitzed" areas of Great Britain, including London, Canterbury, and Exeter. The excavations are to be made in the summer of 1946 in order that they may be completed before these areas are rebuilt.

The London Institute of Archaeology offers to provide for the students' expenses and accommodations while in Great Britain, and at the conclusion of the excavations the British Council invites the students for a two-week tour of the United Kingdom at its expense.

American students wishing to participate in the excavations would have to leave the United States not later than the middle of July and would have to furnish their own transportation expenses to and from Great Britain. Interested students should communicate with the American Council of Learned Societies, 1219 Sixteenth Street NW., Washington 6, D.C., in order to be considered for inclusion in the group of American students going to Great Britain.

Simon S. Kuznets To Visit China

Dr. Simon S. Kuznets, professor of economics and statistics at the University of Pennsylvania, has been invited by the National Resources Commission of China to visit China in June for a period of four months in the capacity of Economic Adviser and to assist the commission in research policies and projects and in the training of research personnel. Dr. Kuznets, an expert on national income statistics, is a vice-president of the American Economic Association and a former vice-president of the American Statistical Association. He served as Associate Director of the Bureau of Planning and Statistics, War Production Board, during 1942 and 1943.

Since December five young Chinese economists have been making preliminary studies, under the

direction of Dr. Kuznets, in preparation for his visit to China. These economists, having completed their graduate training at universities in the United States, are returning to China to work with the National Resources Commission.

Visit of Chinese Meteorologist

[Released to the press April 3]

Dr. Jeou-jang Jaw (Chao Chui-chang), acting director, Institute of Meteorology, Academia Sinica, Chungking, China, arrived on March 31 for a six months' visit in the United States under the Department's cultural-cooperation program. Dr. Jaw has been attending the International Meteorological Conference at London for the past month.

While in this country Dr. Jaw will visit universities and colleges, scientific institutions, and weather observatories.

PHILLIPS—Continued from page 935

6. The government should accumulate and maintain a strategic stockpile of natural rubber. This stockpile should be held wholly apart from stocks in commercial channels and, except for rotation requirements, should be retained for rubber emergency use exclusively.

7. With the certain prospects of a changing rubber situation, continuous review of the problem should be maintained.

The Interagency Policy Committee on Rubber indicated in its report that there were several areas in which further work needed to be done in order to provide the mechanism for carrying out its recommendations. It therefore proposed to continue its work preparatory to issuing a supplementary report on the following subjects:

1. The administrative method by which a minimum use of general-purpose synthetic rubber can best be assured;
2. Methods of assuring continuing research and development;
3. Further plans for plant disposal;
4. The recommended structure for national rubber supervision, together with a more precise definition of the proposed administrative, coordinating, and advisory functions.

U. S. Engineer To Serve in China

[Released to the press May 22]

Richard C. Darnell, consulting engineer on instrument design and application, has been appointed by the Department, under its cultural-cooperation program, to serve in China as a specialist in scientific instruments and laboratory equipment. Mr. Darnell, organizer and president of the Washington Instrument Society, was engaged in development and research on instruments for the Army and Navy during the war years. He was active in the formation of the National Instrument Society and has lectured on physics, engineering, electronics, and instruments at the George Washington, Catholic, and Maryland Universities.

He is going to China, in response to a request made to the Department by the Chinese Ministry of Education, to assist in the selection of modern scientific instruments needed to replace those worn out or looted from universities and research organizations.

Mr. Darnell plans to leave for China early in June and will remain for approximately six months.

Visit of Paraguayan Pathologist

[Released to the press April 3]

Dr. Juan Boggino, former rector of the National University, Asunción, Paraguay, and at present professor of pathology at that institution, is visiting universities and medical centers in this country at the invitation of the Department of State, under its program of cultural cooperation with the other American republics.

Dr. Boggino is interested in acquainting himself with medical schools, their organization and methods of instruction, with university organization in general, and especially with work that is being done in clinical pathology in this country.

During his three months' stay in this country Dr. Boggino plans to visit universities and medical centers in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, New York, Boston, Chicago, Ann Arbor, Minneapolis, St. Louis, San Francisco, and New Orleans.

Dr. Boggino has served in his country in the

capacity of adviser to the National Department of Hygiene, president of the City Council of Asunción, president of the Paraguayan section of the League Against Cancer, and president of the Rotary Club of Asunción.

Physical Education Instructor To Visit in Chile

Kenneth W. Davidson, of Oakland, Calif., has been appointed visiting instructor in physical education at the Catholic University in Santiago, Chile. He is one of a group who has received a travel grant under the program administered by the Department of State for the exchange of professors and technical experts between this country and the other American republics.

John B. Biesanz Accepts Professorship to Panama

Dr. John Biesanz of Winona, Minnesota, has arrived in Panama, where he will serve as visiting professor of sociology in the Inter-American University at Panama. He will conduct classes in introductory sociology and social psychology in the Spanish language. Dr. Biesanz is one of a group of distinguished educators who have received travel grants for visiting professorships under the program administered by the Department of State for the exchange of professors and technical experts between this country and the other American republics.

Visit of Costa Rican Inspector of Indian Schools

Humberto Miranda Vega, inspector of Indian schools in Costa Rica, member of the National Indian Institute and of the Administrative Council on Indian Affairs, is visiting Indian schools and other centers interested in Indian problems in this country at the invitation of the Department of State.

Anglo-Siamese Peace Treaty

PEACE AGREEMENT WITH SIAM

Text of the agreement terminating the state of war between the United Kingdom and India on the one hand and Siam on the other which was signed at Singapore January 1, 1946, as released by the Foreign Office in London January 1

WHEREAS by a proclamation made in Bangkok on the 16th August, 1945, the Regent of Siam did, in the name of His Majesty the King of Siam, proclaim the declaration of war made by Siam on the 25th January, 1942, against the United Kingdom to be null and void in that it was made contrary to the will of the Siamese people and in violation of the Constitution and Laws of Siam, and

WHEREAS the proclamation of the 16th August 1945 aforesaid was the same day unanimously approved by the National Assembly of Siam, and

WHEREAS the Siamese Government have repudiated the Alliance entered into by Siam with Japan on the 21st December, 1941 together with all other treaties, pacts, or agreements concluded between Siam and Japan, and

WHEREAS the Siamese Government are anxious to play their full part in mitigating the effects of the war, particularly in such measures as may be designed to assist in the restoration of international security and general economic welfare, and

WHEREAS the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India, in consideration of the acts of repudiation already carried out by the Siamese Government, and not unmindful of the services rendered by the Resistance Movement in Siam during the war with Japan, desire to bring the state of war to an immediate end, NOW THEREFORE the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India on the one hand and the Siamese Government on the other being desirous of renewing the relations of close friendship which existed before the war, Have resolved to conclude an agreement for these purposes and have accordingly appointed as their plenipotentiaries:—

Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Mr. M. E. Denning, C.M.G., O.B.E.

Government of India:

Mr. M. S. Aney

Siamese Government:

His Serene Highness Prince Viwatchai Chaiyant

Lieutenant-General Phya Abhai Songgram

Nai Serm Vinichayakul

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

RESTITUTION AND READJUSTMENT

Article 1

The Siamese Government agree to repudiate all measures pursuant to the above-mentioned declaration of war

made on the 25th January, 1942, and to take the necessary legislative and administrative measures to give effect to that repudiation.

Article 2

The Siamese Government declare as null and void all purported acquisitions of British territory made by Siam later than December 7, 1941, as well as all titles, rights properties and interests acquired in such territory since that date either by the Siamese State or by Siamese subjects. The Siamese Government agree to take the necessary legislative measures to give effect to the foregoing declaration and in particular

(a) to repeal and declare null and void *ab initio* all legislative and administrative measures relating to the purported annexation by, or incorporation in, Siam of British territories effected after the 7th December, 1941.

(b) to withdraw as may be required by the competent civil or military authority all Siamese military personnel from all such British territories and all Siamese officials and nationals who entered these territories after their purported annexation by, or incorporation in, Siam.

(c) to restore all property taken away from these territories including currency except to the extent to which it can be established that fair value has been given in exchange.

(d) to compensate loss or damage to property, rights and interests in these territories arising out of the occupation of these territories by Siam.

(e) to redeem in sterling out of former sterling reserves current Siamese notes collected by the British authorities in British territory occupied by Siam since the 7th December 1941.

Article 3

The Siamese Government agree to assume responsibility for safeguarding, maintaining and restoring unimpaired, British property, rights and interests of all kinds in Siam and for payment of compensation for losses or damage sustained. The term "property, rights and interests" shall include, *inter alia*, the official property of the Government of the United Kingdom and of the Government of India, property whose ownership has been transferred since the outbreak of war, pensions granted to British nationals, stocks of tin, teak and other commodities, shipping and wharves, and tin, teak and other leases and concessions granted to British firms and individuals prior to the 7th December, 1941, and still valid at that date.

Article 4

The Siamese Government agree to desecrate British banking and commercial concerns and permit them to resume business.

Article 5

The Siamese Government agree to accept liability, with the addition of interest, at an appropriate percentage, in respect of payments in arrears, for the service of loans and for payment of pensions in full since the date when regular payments ceased.

SECURITY**Article 6**

The Siamese Government recognise that the course of events in the war with Japan demonstrates the importance of Siam to the defence of Malaya, Burma, India and Indo-China and the security of the Indian Ocean and South West Pacific areas and the Siamese Government agree to collaborate fully in all international security arrangements approved by the United Nations Organisation or its Security Council which may be pertinent to Siam and especially such international security arrangements as may relate to those countries or areas.

Article 7

The Siamese Government undertake that no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam shall be cut across Siamese territory without the prior concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom.

COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC COLLABORATION**Article 8**

The Siamese Government agree to take all possible measures to re-establish import and export trade between Siam on the one hand and neighbouring British territories on the other, and to adopt and maintain a good neighbourly policy in regard to coastal shipping.

Article 9

The Siamese Government undertake to negotiate with the Government of the United Kingdom as soon as practicable a new Treaty of Establishment, Commerce and Navigation and a Consular Convention based on the reciprocal application of the principles in Article 11 below.

Article 10

The Siamese Government undertake to negotiate with the Government of India as soon as practicable a new Treaty of Commerce and Navigation based on the reciprocal application of the principles in the following Article.

Article 11

(1) Pending the conclusion of the Treaties and Convention referred to in Articles 9 and 10 above and subject to paragraph (2) of this Article, the Siamese Government undertake to observe the provisions of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed at Bangkok on the 23rd

November 1937, and further undertake, except where the Treaty specifically authorizes such action, not to enforce any measures excluding British commercial or industrial interests or British professional men on grounds of nationality from participation in Siamese economy and trade, or any measures requiring them to maintain stocks or reserves in excess of normal commercial, shipping, industrial or business practice.

(2) The above-mentioned undertakings of the Siamese Government (a) shall be subject to such exceptions, if any, as may at any time be agreed to between the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of India, as the case may be, and the Siamese Government; (b) shall, unless prolonged by agreement, lapse if the Treaties and Conventions referred to in Articles 9 and 10 have not been concluded within a period of three years from the coming into force of this Agreement.

(3) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to preclude the grant of equally favourable treatment to nationals and enterprises of any or all other United Nations.

Article 12

The Siamese Government undertake to participate in any general international arrangement regarding tin or rubber which conforms with such principles regarding commodity arrangements as may be agreed by the United Nations Organisation or its Economic and Social Council.

Article 13

Until a date or dates not later than 1st September 1947 the Siamese Government undertake to prohibit, except in accordance with the recommendations of the Combined Boards in Washington, or any successor body, and in the case of rice, under the direction of a special organisation to be set up for the purpose, any exports of rice, tin, rubber and teak and to regulate trade in and stimulate production of these commodities.

Article 14

The Siamese Government undertake to make available free of cost at Bangkok to an organisation to be indicated by the Government of the United Kingdom, and as quickly as may be compatible with the retention of supplies adequate for Siamese internal needs a quantity of rice equal to the accumulated surplus rice at present existing in Siam, subject to a maximum of 1½ million tons, or, if so agreed, the equivalent quantity of paddy or loonzain. It is agreed that the exact amount of rice to be made available under this Article shall be determined by the organisation above-mentioned and that the rice, paddy or loonzain delivered under this Article shall conform to the agreed standards of quality to be determined by the same authorities.

Article 15

Until a date not later than the 1st September 1947 the Siamese Government agree to make available to the Rice Organisation mentioned in Articles 13 and 14 all rice surplus to the internal needs of Siam. Such rice, with the exception of rice delivered free in accordance with the undertaking given in Article 14, will be supplied in such manner as the special organisation mentioned in Articles

13 and 14 shall indicate and at prices fixed in agreement with it, having regard to the controlled prices of rice in other Asiatic rice-exporting areas.

CIVIL AVIATION

Article 16

The Siamese Government shall accord to the Civil Air Services of the British Commonwealth of Nations by means of agreements to be negotiated with Governments of Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations treatment in regard to establishment, maintenance and operation of regular air services not less favourable than that accorded to Imperial Airways by the Notes exchanged at Bangkok on the 3rd December 1937.

WAR GRAVES

Article 17

The Siamese Government undertake to enter into an agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India for the mutual upkeep of war graves with a view to the permanent establishment and future care of British and Indian war graves and of Siamese war graves in their respective territories.

MISCELLANEOUS

Article 18

The Siamese Government agree to regard as in force such bilateral treaties between the United Kingdom and Siam and India and Siam as may respectively be specified by the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India, subject to any modifications the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of India may indicate and to regard as abrogated any such treaties not so specified.

Article 19

The Siamese Government agree to regard as being in force between the United Kingdom and Siam and between India and Siam all multilateral treaties, conventions or agreements concluded prior to 7th December 1941 (a) to which Siam and the United Kingdom or India, as the case may be, were then and still are parties (b) to which the United Kingdom or India, as the case may be, was then and still is a party but to which Siam has not become a party and which shall be notified to the Siamese Government by the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of India.

On the receipt of such notification the Siamese Government shall immediately take the necessary steps, in accordance with the provisions of any such treaty, convention or agreement to which Siam is not a contracting party, to accede thereto, or if accession is not possible, shall give effect to the provisions thereof in respect of the United Kingdom or India, as the case may be, by such legislative or administrative means as may be appropriate. The Siamese Government agree also to accept any modifications thereto which may have come into effect in accordance with the terms of such instruments since that date.

Article 20

Pending admission to any international organisation set up since the 7th December 1941, being an organisation of which the United Kingdom or India is a member, the Siamese Government agree to carry out any obligations arising out of, or in connexion with any such organisation or the instrument constituting it, as may at any time be specified by the Government of the United Kingdom or the Government of India as the case may be.

Article 21

In consideration of the above undertakings made by the Siamese Government, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India agree to regard the state of war as terminated and to proceed at once to the resumption of friendly relations with Siam and to exchange of diplomatic representatives.

Article 22

The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of India also undertake to support Siam's candidature for membership of the United Nations.

DEFINITIONS AND DATE OF ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AGREEMENT

Article 23

It is agreed by the contracting parties that the term "British" in this Agreement (1) when applied to physical persons shall mean all subjects of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India, and all persons under His Majesty's protection; (2) when applied to territory shall mean any territory under His Majesty's sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate, as the case may be; (3) when applied to legal persons shall mean all legal persons deriving their status as such from the law in force in any such territory; and (4) when applied to property, rights or interests shall mean the property, rights or interests of persons specified under (1) or (3) above, as the case may be.

Article 24

This Agreement shall enter into force as from to-day's date.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in triplicate at Singapore this 1st day of January, in the 1946th year of the Christian Era, corresponding to the 2,489th year of the Buddhist Era in the English language.

Great Britain and Northern Ireland

M. E. Denning

India

M. S. Aney

(This signature is appended in agreement with His Majesty's Representative for the exercise of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States.)

Siam

Viwat

Phya Abhai Songgram

Lieut.-Gen.

S. Vinichayakul

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF SIAM AND AUSTRALIA¹

Colonel A. J. Eastman to Prince Vucatchai Chaiyant

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

SINGAPORE

1st January 1946

YOUR SERENE HIGHNESS,

With reference to our discussions at Government House, SINGAPORE, on 11th., 15th., 19th., and 31st. December 1945 and to the verbal agreement reached between us on the last mentioned date, I have the honour to request, on behalf of the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA, that you forward to me a letter signed by yourself and the other plenipotentiary members of your Delegation confirming the undertaking of the Government of SIAM that it will:—

(1) take promptly all action necessary for the complete repudiation of the declaration of war made against GREAT BRITAIN on 25th. January 1942, the Alliance with JAPAN made on 21st. December 1941 and all measures operating to the detriment of GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA and their Allies;

(2) when called upon to do so at any time before 14th. March 1946, conclude a treaty with the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA

(a) certifying that the Government of SIAM has taken all action necessary for the complete repudiation of the declaration of war, the Alliance and the measures referred to in Clause 1 above and

(b) obliging the Government of SIAM:—

(i) to assume responsibility for the maintenance and good upkeep of all Australian war graves in SIAM;

(ii) to assume responsibility for complying with the directions of the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA with respect to the well-being and interests of all Australian residents detained or interned in SIAM since 8th. December 1941;

(iii) to undertake full assistance in the apprehension and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes against Australians;

(iv) to assume responsibility for compensating the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA and Australian citizens for all losses and damage sustained by them directly or indirectly since 8th. December 1941 in SIAM or as a result of Siamese activity outside SIAM;

(v) to undertake measures of regional, political and economic cooperation consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter and designed to ensure the security of South East Asia and the South West Pacific area; and

¹ Also included in the Siamese print of the above agreement.

*N. B. For the enclosure mentioned see Formal Agreement with Great Britain.

(vi) to carry out such of the obligations specified in the formal agreement entered into this day between the Government of the UNITED KINGDOM and the Government of INDIA on the one hand and the Government of SIAM on the other (copy of which is attached to this letter and initialled by me)* as the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA considers to be applicable in principle to Australian policy and interests and requires the Government of SIAM to undertake.

Such treaty to oblige the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA to terminate the state of war existing between AUSTRALIA and SIAM.

I have the honour to confirm that, upon the completion of the action mentioned in Clause 1 above and upon the coming into force of the treaty mentioned in Clause 2, the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA will be prepared to terminate the state of war existing between it and the Government of SIAM.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express to Your Serene Highness the assurance of my high consideration.

A. J. EASTMAN

Plenipotentiary to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia for the conclusion of arrangements relative to the termination of the state of war with Siam.

His Serene Highness

Prince VIWATCHAI CHAIYANT,
Head of the Siamese Delegation,
Singapore.

Prince Vucatchai Chaiyant to Colonel A. J. Eastman

SINGAPORE

1st January 1946.

SIR,

We have the honour to acknowledge your letter of 1st January 1946 and to state that we are instructed by His Majesty's Government to undertake on their behalf that they will:—

(1) take promptly all action necessary for the complete repudiation of the declaration of war made against GREAT BRITAIN on 25th January 1942, the Alliance with JAPAN made on 21st December 1941 and all measures operating to the detriment of GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA and their Allies;

(2) when called upon to do so at any time before 14th March 1946, conclude a treaty with Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA

(a) certifying that the Government of SIAM has taken all action necessary for the complete repudiation of the declaration of war, the Alliance and the measures referred to in Clause (1) above, and

(b) obliging the Government of SIAM:—

- (i) to assume responsibility for the maintenance and good upkeep of all Australian war graves in SIAM;
- (ii) to assume responsibility for complying with the directions of the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA with respect to the well-being and interests of all Australian residents detained or interned in SIAM since 8th December 1941;
- (iii) to undertake full assistance in the apprehension and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes against Australians;
- (iv) to assume responsibility for compensating the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA and Australian citizens for all losses and damage sustained by them directly or indirectly since 8th December 1941 in SIAM or as a result of Siamese activity outside SIAM;
- (v) to undertake measures of regional, political and economic co-operation consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter and designed to ensure the security of South East Asia and the South West Pacific area; and
- (vi) to carry out such of the obligations specified in the Formal Agreement entered into this day between the Government of the UNITED KINGDOM and the Government of INDIA on the one hand and the Government of SIAM on the other, (copy of which is attached to this letter and initialled by us)* as the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA considers to be applicable in principle to Australian policy and interests and requires the Government of SIAM to undertake.

Such treaty to oblige the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA to terminate the state of war existing between AUSTRALIA and SIAM;

In this connection we have the honour to confirm that His Majesty's Government has already taken all necessary action to repudiate the declaration of war and the alliance referred to in Clause (1) and all other treaties, pacts and agreements between SIAM and JAPAN; and that in the interval between the date of this letter and the conclusion of the Treaty mentioned in Clause (2), His Majesty's Government will take immediate steps, as far as possible, to put into effect the terms set out in that Clause and in all respects to act in accordance with their spirit.

His Majesty's Government note that, upon completion of the action mentioned in Clause (1) above and upon the coming into force of the treaty mentioned in Clause (2), the Government of the Commonwealth of AUSTRALIA will be prepared to terminate the state of war existing between it and His Majesty's Government.

We avail ourselves of this opportunity to express to you the assurance of our high consideration.

VIWAT

PHYA ABHAI SORGRAM
S. VINICCHAYAKUL

*Plenipotentiaries to the Government of Siam
for the conclusion of arrangements relative to
the termination of the state of war between
Australia and Siam.*

Colonel A. J. EASTMAN,

Plenipotentiary to the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia.

*N.B. For the enclosure mentioned see Formal Agreement with Great Britain.

Addresses and Statements of the Week

The President	Welcome to the Economic and Social Council. Not printed	Read by John G. Winant, U. S. Representative, at the opening meeting in New York on May 25
The President	Statement made at the first meeting of FAO on Urgent Food Problems. Printed in this issue	Meeting held in Washington on May 20
The Secretary of State	Report on the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers. Printed in this issue	Broadcast on May 20 from Washington
Assistant Secretary Braden	The Challenge of Liberalism. Text issued as press release 336 of May 15; not printed	Commencement address at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., on May 26
Francis Russell Acting Director, Office of Public Affairs	On the subject of our economic foreign policy. Text issued as press release 346 of May 21; not printed	Made at the New Brunswick Forum at New Brunswick, N. J., on May 21

Soviet-Mongolian Treaty and Agreement

The American Embassy at Moscow has transmitted to the Department the texts of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Economic and Cultural Collaboration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic, signed on February 27, 1946. The texts of the treaty and agreement as published in the Moscow News March 2, 1946, are as follows:

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

In view of the expiration of the ten-year term of operation of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidium of the Small Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic have decided to convert the following Protocol of March 12, 1936, into a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance valid for ten years:

"The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Mongolian People's Republic, in view of the relations of invariable friendship which have existed between their countries since the liberation of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1921 with the assistance of the Red Army from the detachments of White Guards who were connected with the armed forces which invaded the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, guided by the desire to maintain the cause of peace in the Far East and contribute to the further consolidation of the friendly relations existing between them, have decided to embody in the present protocol the gentleman's agreement existing between them since Nov. 27, 1934, providing for mutual support by every means in averting and preventing the threat of military attack, and also for rendering each other assistance and support in case of attack by any third party on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or the Mongolian People's Republic, for which purpose the present protocol is to be signed.

Article I

"In case of the threat of attack on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or of the Mongolian People's Republic by a third state, the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Mongolian People's Republic undertake immediately to discuss jointly the situation that has arisen and to take all such measures as might be necessary to safeguard the security of their territory.

Article II

"The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Mongolian People's Republic undertake in the event of the military attack on one of the Contracting Parties to render each other every assistance, including military assistance.

Article III

"The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the Mongolian People's Republic deem it self-understood that the troops of one of the Parties stationed by mutual agreement on the territory of the other Party, in fulfillment of undertakings under Article I or II, will be withdrawn from the territory in question without delay when the necessity for this is over, as was the case in 1925 with regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic."

The present Treaty comes into force from the moment of its ratification, which must be effected within as short a time as possible. The exchange of ratification instruments will take place in Ulan Bator.

Unless one of the High Contracting Parties one year prior to the expiration of the term of the present Treaty gives notice of its desire to denounce the Treaty, it will remain valid for the next ten years.

Done in Moscow, Feb. 27, 1946, which corresponds to the 27th day of the second moon of the 36th year of the Mongolian calendar, in two copies, each in the Russian and Mongolian languages, both texts being equally valid.

On authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

V. MOLOTOV

On authorization of the Presidium of the Small Hural of the Mongolian People's Republic.

CHOIBALSAN

AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, considering that economic and cultural collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic established since the time of the foundation of the Mongolian People's Republic has proved extremely fruitful and corresponding to the interests of both countries, have decided to conclude the present Agreement and agreed on the following:

Article I

Both Contracting Parties agree to develop and consolidate collaboration in the fields of economy, culture and education existing between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Mongolian People's Republic.

Article II

On the basis of the present Agreement, and in pursuance of it, separate treaties and agreements will be concluded between the respective economic, scientific, and cultural and educational institutions and organizations of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic.

Article III

The present Agreement comes into force from the moment of its signing and will be valid for ten years.

Unless one of the Contracting Parties one year before the expiration of the term of the present Agreement gives notice of its desire to denounce the Agreement, it will remain in force for the subsequent ten years.

Done in Moscow, Feb. 27, 1946, which corresponds to the 27th day of the second moon of the 36th year of the Mongolian calendar, in two copies, each in the Russian and Mongolian languages, both texts being equally valid.

On authorization of the Government of the USSR.

V. MOLOTOV

On authorization of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic

CHOIBALSAN

Publications

Foreign Commerce Weekly

The following articles of interest to readers of the BULLETIN appeared in the May 11 issue of *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, a publication of the Department of Commerce, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for 10 cents each:

"Shanghai Suffers From Onerous Living Costs", based on reports from A. Bland Calder, commercial attaché, American Consulate General, Shanghai.

"Iceland's Cooperatives", based on a report from Joseph H. Rogatnick, economic analyst, American Legation, Reykjavik.

The following article appeared in the May 25 issue:

"Brazilian Vegetable Oils Form Source of Big Trade", by Kenneth Wernimont, agricultural commissioner, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro.

The Department

Appointment of Officers

C. Tyler Wood, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, as the official in the Department of State to represent the Assistant Secretary on UNRRA affairs, effective March 8, 1946.

Cecil Wayne Gray as Chief of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel, effective April 15, 1946.

Frederick B. Lyon as Director of the Office of Controls, effective April 29, 1946.

Jack D. Neal as Chief of the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation, effective April 29, 1946.

Resignation of Stokeley W. Morgan

The Department of State announced on May 15 the resignation of Stokeley W. Morgan as Chief of the Aviation Division of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy, to become effective June 15, 1946.

Departmental Regulations

232.1 Liaison Between the Department of State and the National Archives: (Effective 3-1-46)

I LIAISON RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND PUBLICATION (RP). The responsibility for maintaining liaison with the National Archives is vested in RP, and the Chief of RP serves as the Liaison Officer for the Department and is a member of the National Archives Council. With completion of the transfer of the decimal file, 1910-1929, the liaison activities of RP now include various functions relating to the files of the Department from 1789 to 1929, inclusive, which are in the custody of the Division of State Department Archives of the National Archives.

II PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF THE LIAISON FACILITIES OF RP. Persons desiring to utilize the records in the National Archives, or desiring to transfer or otherwise dispose of records, will follow the procedures outlined below:

A To obtain information or to borrow records from the National Archives (including records from Government agencies other than the Department of State), either telephone or address a memorandum to the Archives Liaison Unit (RP).

B To request RP to perform research based on the records now in the National Archives and to prepare memoranda incorporating the results of such research, either telephone or address a request to the Archives Liaison Unit (RP).

C To arrange for the transfer of records to the custody of the National Archives, either address a memo-

random to the Chief of RP or telephone the Archives Liaison Unit (RP).

D To arrange for the preparation of disposal lists or schedules of records for the purpose of obtaining authorization for destruction or other disposal of records, either address a memorandum to the Chief of RP or telephone the Archives Liaison Unit (RP).

E To return records borrowed from the National Archives, send the material to the Archives Liaison Unit. Material from the decimal file, 1910-December 31, 1929, borrowed from Records Branch, Division of Communications and Records (DC) prior to January 1946, will be returned to the Archives Liaison Unit (RP).

232.2 Contacts With the Department of Justice Regarding Immigration and Visa Matters: (Effective 5-1-46)

The responsibility for maintaining liaison with the Department of Justice with regard to immigration and visa matters is vested in the Visa Division. As questions concerning these matters are of a highly technical nature and require special knowledge of the rules and regulations as well as a familiarity with the technical application of these rules, all questions which are brought to the attention of other officers of the Department, either from foreign embassies or legations or from other sources, will be referred to the Visa Division. Officers will not, in any instance, contact the Department of Justice direct.

183.7 Passenger Shipping Committee (PSC): (Effective 5-1-46)

I COMPOSITION. PSC shall be composed of:

A Representative of the geographic (political) offices of the Department.

B Representative of the functional (economic) offices of the Department.

C Representative of the administrative offices of the Department.

D Secretary provided by the Central Secretariat of the Executive Staff Committees (ESC).

II FUNCTIONS. The functions of PSC shall be as follows:

A To coordinate all interests of the Department in the procurement and allocation of passenger space on ocean transportation facilities.

B To establish and to enforce where necessary relative priorities among projects for use of such space, which the Department may be called upon to sponsor by reason of public need, Congressional mandate, or essential political or economic considerations.

C To take the necessary steps for the procurement of space for approved projects.

D To establish where necessary relative priorities among categories of passengers who might be accommodated in space procured.

E To designate and provide representation of the Department upon an interdepartmental committee which will serve in a comparable capacity for the Federal Government as a whole.

III MATTERS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF PSC. The Shipping Division (SD) and the Trans-

portation Section of the Division of Central Services (CS/T) will advise the Committee on matters concerning their respective fields whenever necessary. PSC shall not concern itself with the following matters, which are the responsibility of SD and CS/T, respectively:

A Questions of broad shipping policy.

B Aviation priorities and the procurement accommodations for the transportation of employees of the Department or the Foreign Service and their effects. On facilities inbound to the United States CS/T shall check with the Committee as to previous allocation before authorizing space.

IV PROCEDURE. The procedure outlined below will be followed in the procurement and allocation of space for ocean transportation for individuals, groups, or categories of persons:

A Any officer of the Department desiring to initiate a project for the procurement of ocean transportation facilities, or receiving from a source outside the Department a request for assistance in such a project (whether or not such a request is to be granted), shall notify the Secretary of PSC in writing specifying:

1 Nature of project, including number, breakdown by sex, nationality, and location of passengers.

2 Political, economic, or other factors weighing for or against acceptance of project.

3 Proposed means of financing project in United States dollars. If Departmental funds or financing are concerned, the paper must be concurred in by the Office of Budget and Finance (OBF).

4 Recommendation as to urgency and merit of project.

B Any officer of the Department desiring to request of a field office special consideration for the transportation of a designated individual, or individuals, shall, before undertaking such action, consult the Secretary of PSC in order to insure that any draft prepared to initiate action shall conform in purpose, form, and content to the program of the Committee; he shall further insure that the file contains a written record of such consultation with the Secretary, whether consultation was by telephone or memorandum. Arrangements for persons travelling outbound in accordance with orders issued by CS/T and for seamen being repatriated by SD are excepted from the foregoing provisions of this paragraph.

C The Division of Coordination and Review (CR), the Division of Foreign Reporting Services (FR), and the Distribution and Liaison Section of the Division of Communications and Records (DC/L) shall make sure that outgoing correspondence from the Department, transmitted through their media, conform to the requirements of paragraphs IV A and B.

D Persons outside the Department desiring information regarding the Department's program with respect to passenger shipping shall be referred for such information to the Secretary of PSC.

183.4 Policy Information Services: (Effective 3-22-46). There will be maintained within the Department such policy information services as will from time to time be

determined by the Secretary or his Staff Committee as necessary for the proper functioning of the Department and of its missions abroad. The policy information services will be distinct from the public information services maintained under the supervision and guidance of the public information and liaison officers of the Department, and will in large part be based on classified information not available to the public and to the press.

I FUNCTIONS. The policy information services will include the:

A Circulation within each Office of such informational material as may, in the determination of each Director, be necessary to the proper coordination and functioning of his Office.

B Circulation among missions, and between the Department and the missions of such informational material as may be determined as necessary to the proper functioning of the missions.

C Circulation between Offices within the Department of such informational material as may be deemed necessary for the proper coordination and functioning of the Department as a whole.

D Circulation from the Offices to the Office of the Secretary of informational material for the background information of the Secretary, and through him, of the President.

E Dissemination from the Office of the Secretary and from his Staff Committee, of such policy decisions and other developmental data as may be necessary for the guidance of officers in the Department and of chiefs of missions abroad.

F Exchange between U. S. Government Agencies of material of mutual interest.

II POLICY INFORMATION COMMITTEE.

A Functions. The Policy Information Committee will:

1 Direct the organization of the policy information services flowing out of the several Offices of the Department for the use of officers both within the Department and in missions abroad, and determine policy as to the form and use of such services.

2 Review constantly the entire field of internal information services, both classified and unclassified, in whatever form.

a In carrying out its reviewing function, the Committee will have as its objective the maintenance of an integrated series of concise, comprehensive and timely information services both classified and unclassified, meeting the individual requirements of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries, Office Directors, and Division Chiefs in the Department, and ambassadors and ministers and their assistants in the field.

3 Initiate action for the improvement of the entire field of internal information services when such action is deemed advisable.

4 The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Committee, with such assistance as they may require, will serve as Editorial Board of the Committee. The Board will be charged with the task of collecting, collating,

and editing such informational material as may be usefully made known to U.S. missions throughout the world, as well as, on an inter-Office basis, to appropriate officers within the Department; and in certain instances, to high officers in other departments and agencies of the Government. The circulation of this edited informational material may be in any one of several approved forms. In its work the Editorial Board shall rely on and receive the full cooperation of the members of the Policy Information Committee who shall see that full information on the activities of their respective offices is made available to it.

B Composition.

1 The Committee shall be composed of Policy Information Officers, designated by the several Office Directors to represent them on the Committee. Offices above the administrative grade of Director's Office may also, in their discretion, appoint representatives to the Committee.

2 The Briefing Officer to the Secretary will be Chairman of the Committee; and his principal assistant, who will act in his absence, will be Vice Chairman.

3 The Committee may select its secretary and may create such *ad hoc* subcommittees as from time to time may be found necessary.

4 The Secretariat of the Committee will operate administratively as a part of the Office of the Secretary.

5 The symbol of the committee will be S/I.

III POLICY INFORMATION OFFICERS.

A Functions. The Chief Policy Information Officer in the office of each Office Director within the Department, responsible to and representing the Director will:

1 Maintain the flow of policy information material from the various Offices of the Department to the Briefing Officer to the Secretary, and to the Editorial Board of the Committee. Each Policy Information Officer will carry on his activities within his office as a member of the staff of the Director, working administratively in such manner and with such assistance as the Director shall determine.

2 In addition to the maintenance of the services set forth above, the Chief Policy Information Officers and their staffs will fulfill such other related functions within their Offices as their individual Directors shall assign to them. Among these functions may be policy liaison with other specified offices working in close collaboration with the Office; office liaison on the policy level with other departmental committees requiring the representation of the Director; and policy information liaison with other departments or agencies of the Government.

The Foreign Service

Confirmation

On May 3, 1946 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Walter Thurston to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States to Mexico.

Training Announcements

Arrangements for Military and Naval Attachés

The Division of Training Services has entered into an arrangement with the Military Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence to assist in the orientation of military attachés and naval attachés in the course of their preparation for field duty. It will be the responsibility of the Training Division to make appointments in the Department of State for the attachés to see desk officers who can give them useful background and information in regard to their country of assignment. Military and naval attachés will also attend area seminars conducted by the Training Division and selected lectures in the Departmental Orientation Series. Special conferences may be organized to meet needs of some groups of attachés.

Foreign Service Orientation Series

Edward Acheson, director of the school of foreign service, George Washington University, will speak on "The Relation of the Foreign Service to the National Welfare", Wednesday, June 12, at 9 a.m., Room 474, Main State Department Building. Dr. Acheson is very much interested in the future development and growth of the Foreign Service and in his capacity as director of the school of foreign service at George Washington University is developing special courses for candidates for the Foreign Service examinations.

Departmental Orientation Series

Isaac N. P. Stokes, former Solicitor of the War Production Board and now Associate Chief, Division of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, will speak on "The United Nations", Tuesday, June 11, at 11 a.m., Room 474, Main State Department Building.

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